

Academic Conference

System Transformation: in Central Asia and in Comparative Perspectives

20 – 21 September, 2019 Bishkek
Conference Rapporteur: Aigoul Abdoubaetova

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Introduction

On 20 - 21 September 2019, in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE Academy in Bishkek organized a conference titled “System Transformation in Central Asia and Comparative Perspectives.” This academic conference brought together a number of distinguished international and regional scholars and practitioners, who shared their views and perspectives on system and regime transformations in the region and beyond.

The two-day conference delivered five plenary sessions. Dr. Alexander Wolters, Director of the OSCE Academy and Mr. Alexander Rosenplaenter, Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, opened the conference. Dr. Wolters welcomed conference participants and highlighted that it is a rare opportunity to meet such internationally distinguished guests in Bishkek. Mr. Rosenplaenter briefed about the work of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kyrgyzstan. He noted that a relatively liberal environment in Kyrgyzstan benefits the Foundation in achieving its mission in the region.

Dr. Anja Mihr, Senior Visiting Lecturer of the OSCE Academy from the DAAD German Foreign Academic Exchange office, moderated the conference on both days. In the introduction session, she welcomed everyone and explained the outline of the conference. Dr. Mihr highlighted that the conference was organized not only for the region, but also with the region, stressing the importance of the presence of intellectual agency of the local scholars, including students present in the room.

The key note speaker of the conference was Dr. Wolfgang Merkel, Professor from the Social Science Research Center (WZB), Berlin, Germany. Dr. Merkel is the author of the book “Democracy and Crisis: Challenges in Turbulent Times,” 2019 and he lectured on key findings from his book. Other invited speakers from abroad included Dr. Manfred Nowak, the Secretary General of the Global Campus of Human Rights in Venice, Italy, Dr. Christian Haerpfer, President of the World Value Association, Dr. Kseniya Kizilova, head of the Secretariat of the World Value Survey Association, Vienna, Austria and Dr. Mario Sznajder, Professor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

The conference was closed by Dr. Medetkan Sherimkulov’s speech, who is a former Speaker of the first Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic. In his speech, Mr. Sherimkulov talked about his experience of building Kyrgyz statehood and Parliamentarism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The conference was generously funded by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kyrgyzstan. The following report summarizes key topics presented and themes that emerged during discussions.

Understanding Political Regimes

The conference started with the conceptualization of regimes and framed the core ideas to be discussed. One panelist gave an extended overview of different types of regimes and various approaches to categorizing and classifying them. There are two generally recognized types of political regimes: democracy and autocracy. Summarizing several panelists' opinions, we can define democracy as a system, where societies or nation states are governed based on rule of law, free elections and active civic participations, while autocracies refer to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, ruled by one leader or one ruling party.

However, looking at political regimes in such a binary way is misleading. In reality, regimes are much more complex to define and each regime type, be it democracy or autocracy, can be divided into subtypes or subcategories. For example, democracies are subcategorized as full and flawed democracies. Not all authoritarian regimes should be called dictatorships. The number of true dictatorships is very low. It is also often difficult to draw a clear line between the two regime types. There are countries which are not open democracies, but they are also not clear autocracies. In fact, large numbers of countries around the world fall in between, and these borderline regimes are called hybrid regimes.

To better understand the complexity of identifying regimes, scholars use a “gradualist approach” as one of the most explanatory methods. The gradualist approach does not allow to immediately group countries into one single regime type. Rather, it helps to explain the migratory pattern of regimes, where a given country may migrate from one political regime to another, or it may stay as a solid hybrid regime, depending on the context and specific political environments. Germany in the 20th century is a good example of a regime migration. It started off as a soft authoritarianism but later became the totalitarian regime under Nazi rule. After the end of the World War II, the country shifted to a defective democracy and, finally, achieved its existing state of full democracy.

Looking into different types of regimes resulted in lively discussions among the conference participants, who raised a number of questions about the dichotomic (democracy versus autocracy) and trichotomic (democracy, hybrid, autocracy) definitions of regime types and also the methodological considerations. Classifying democracies created a special challenge for the conference participants. Should countries like Ukraine be considered democracies and grouped into the same level with Sweden or France? Is India, known as an electoral democracy, as democratic as Germany? A panelist who specialized on regime theories answered many similar questions.

Another panelist, using slightly different terminology, explained some of the major differences between the two types of democracies. According to him, there are liberal and defective democracies. Liberal democracies are based on rule of law while defective democracies ‘earn’ their status on the basis of citizens’ political participations, such as participation in elections and voting processes. Defective democracies may follow the general logic of democracy and may show increased political participation, but the quality

of respecting or implementing the rule of law in such democracies is poor. Defective democracies may also control NGOs and civil society or limit the free and independent media. A takeaway from the discussions of democratic regimes was that it is much harder to achieve the rule of law-based (liberal) democracy.

Is Democracy in “Crisis”?

The topic that caused a lot of debates, disagreements and discussions and echoed across several panels, was about the decline of democracies and rise of autocracies. During the several last decades, the world’s top political scientists and authors have written many books about the first, second and third waves of “the end of democracies.”

One of the speakers, however, challenged these alarmistic views, and argued that the “crisis” of democracy is not empirically proven. Empirical facts and statistics over long period of historical time frames tell the opposite. According to this panelist’s analysis, democracies nowadays are not dying and the number of not free states is decreasing. The data from Freedom House also confirms this. There were more democracies in 2018 than in 1998. From all Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan holds the most positive outlook, while neighboring republics’ status remains stable, not necessarily dropping down.

Most of the conference participants expressed their doubts about such a positive outlook on democracies both on a global and a regional level. Many participants argued that autocratic regimes are on the rise. The repression of Muslim minorities in China and militarization in Turkey are some of many examples that were mentioned.

The presentation that focused on the negative effect of neoliberalism on democracy shed further doubts on the optimistic views on the growth of democratic regimes. One panelist looked at the link between democracy and human rights and explained that democracy is highly integrated into international human rights concepts. Political rights, political freedoms, rights of people to self-determination, equality and non-discrimination are all essential aspects of both human rights and democracy. The panelist argued that too much of neoliberalism violates both human rights and threatens democracy in a number of ways.

First, neoliberalism promotes economic inequality. Historically, there were two periods with the highest levels of inequality: 1) the 19th century under the influence of colonialism and industrialization and 2) the era of neoliberalism after 1980s which replaced the more or less egalitarian order of the mid-20th century. One consequence of the latter has been the rise of an income gap between the rich and the poor, which leads to the loss of social cohesion and low trust among the citizens, which is an impediment for building healthy democratic communities.

Second, neoliberalism promotes mindless privatization, even of core state functions that provide basic services, in such areas as education, health and public infrastructure. Privatization of public services puts the lives of the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups

at risk, violating their fundamental rights and undermining the legitimacy of a democratic state. Under neoliberalist regimes, democratic governance may be endangered by the weaker role of states and civil society over transnational corporations. Politics and business become highly interrelated and the role of money in winning elections increases, which can lead to the election of the rich, populist and right-wing leaders into politics.

There was an overall consensus among the conference participants that indeed new authoritarian and right-wing regimes are rising despite the lack of empirical facts on the crisis of democracies. However, some participants also raised questions about how to keep a healthy middle line, acknowledging the role of neoliberalism in creating wealth and eradicating poverty. For instance, authoritarian regimes like China or Singapore, through implementing neoliberal economic policies, have achieved immense economic growth in a short period of time. One panelist suggested that the key for a balanced approach to bringing economic development without exacerbating the inequality gap lies in keeping the core public services free of charge. Basic services such as water, health and education should not be privatized and every state should guarantee its citizens access to these services. Another recommendation was that countries should strive to the democratic models of the Nordic countries, with low economic inequality and state-owned public services.

State Building in Central Asia

Political changes in post-Soviet Central Asian republics took place at a varying pace and degree. Some countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, faced significant system transformations. Kyrgyzstan overcame two revolutions in just one decade, first in 2005 and then in 2010. Within 29 years of independence, the country's constitution was altered nine times. There was also a shift from the Presidential to Semi-Presidential system. In 2017 the country elected its fifth President. This is in stark contrast to its neighbors, where changes have been slow and successor presidents came to power only upon the retirement or death of their predecessors. Yet, there are many similarities in state building experiences of the Central Asian countries.

One of the intriguing topics of the conference was the introduction of the concept “political bricolage” by one of the panelists. Political bricolage, as explained, means a creative and practical mixing of institutions based on what is available, using diverse things at hand. The concept is applicable to all Central Asian countries, as every leader of the five countries used it in building their independent states.

Central Asian leaders used a mixture of three different institutions. The panelist named them as the old (Soviet), the new (western) and the strange (traditional) models of institutional governance. When the Soviet Union collapsed, all succeeding states of the region automatically relied on the Soviet heritage of central planning. Until today the Soviet model is popular in most of the state institutions. However, the given states also actively borrowed some new structures from the West. For instance, the writing of the

Constitutions, separation of powers, holding elections and introducing multi-party systems were completely novel developments that the elites borrowed from the west.

Another panelist, who was part of the state building process in the foundational years of Kyrgyz statehood, elaborated this emulation of the new western model in much more detail. According to him, Kyrgyzstan was a showcase of the experimentation with western ideas. Kyrgyz elites in the early 1990s, headed by the first President Akaev and the so-called Legendary Parliament members, heavily relied on the experience of Western Europe and the USA. The first constitution, written in 1993, is considered the most perfect of all versions of the Kyrgyz Constitutions. The speaker highlighted that it was the closest to the Fifth Republic of France, which satisfied the norms of universal human rights, freedom of speech and many other aspects of liberal democracy.

However, what makes political bricolage most unique in the context of Central Asia is the introduction of the third element - the use of “the strange” (or local and traditional institutions) in state building practices. While keeping the old and importing new models, Central Asian leaders in parallel eagerly borrowed and revived their traditional, largely informal governance methods. They activated clan-based systems and mobilized tribal networks. The most popular examples of reviving traditional institutions include the comeback of such platforms as ‘kurultai’ (political forums) in Kyrgyzstan, ‘halk maslahati’ (a similar forum) in Turkmenistan and the institute of ‘el basy’ (special name given to the first president of the nation) in Kazakhstan. El Basy has been formalized in Kazakhstan and former President Nazarbaev has been granted this status.

Dismantling the concept of political bricolage was a useful exercise for comparatively analyzing the state building experiences of the five Central Asian states. One takeaway from the discussion of the concept is that of its continuity. Political bricolage is an ongoing process. It is not clear for now how it may turn out in each country. At the moment, only the Nazarbaev phenomenon shows that bricolage may work. Political bricolage works differently in each of the republics depending on the specific context and the dynamics of their transformations.

Another conclusion that can be drawn about political bricolage is the possibility of mixing the formal with informal institutions in Central Asia. State building experiences in Central Asia do not fit a binary model and analyzing regime and system changes should go beyond simplistic patterns of viewing old against the new or formal against the informal.

The Role of External Players in Central Asia

With decreasing western interest in the region, and the declining economic power of Russia, there are now new players emerging in the Central Asian landscape. One of them is undoubtedly China, with its grand connectivity plans via its Belt and Road Initiative that includes more than 100 countries of the world. There are others too. One panelist focused on the role of India in the region. India plans to increase its connectivity with Central Asia

through its International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC aims to increase transportation links between India, Russia, Central Asia and Iran. Central Asia is an attractive region for countries like India and China, most of all for economic purposes. The region is rich in oil and gas. The panelist predicted that the appetites for energy consumption of emerging powers will only grow in coming years. Therefore, India will continue to promote cooperation projects with Central Asia despite the fact that it has no borders and direct land connection. India plans to do so through economic cooperation and soft power influence.

Challenges of Building Democracies: Cases from Israel, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

Democracy building faces many challenges both in established and establishing democracies. One threat to democracy is the rise of populism around the world. Populism is a tool used by charismatic leaders who appeal to the ordinary people to gain political and electoral support. Populists continue to gain power in so-called established democracies, such the USA, Indonesia and Brazil. One panelist's presentation was devoted to populism in Israel. As the presenter explained, populism is an ideology that invents 'dangerous others,' or a certain group of elites, who are depriving ordinary people from their values, identities and prosperity.

In the case of Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu was able to successfully use populist rhetoric in gaining and preserving political support, highly personalizing politics around himself. He skillfully exploited anti-refugee, anti-Arab, anti-Leftist and anti-Iranian appeals. Populism was also useful in instilling the opposition, which in the end resulted in destroying the checks and balances in Israeli politics necessary for a democratic regime.

In continuing this topic, a panelist from Kyrgyzstan talked about a situation which is quite the opposite of Israel. Kyrgyzstan's problem is the absolute lack of a strong, populist or nationalist leader who can inspire people to follow.

The main challenge for Kyrgyzstan's democracy building is indifference and lack of hope for positive change among the population. After two revolutions and five presidents, two of whom are exiled and one jailed, the enthusiasm for positive change no longer mobilizes people. As it was presented by the panelist, in terms of democracy, Kyrgyzstan ticks all the right boxes: it has fairly free elections, political pluralism with 29 parties, vibrant civil society, opposition groups and even quite unpredictable presidential elections. There are also mechanisms for tracking the wealth of politicians and the public is constantly entertained by political scandals regularly reported in the relatively free and independent media. However, these are just superficial indicators. There is a parallel world that tells a completely different story. In reality, democracy in Kyrgyzstan is coopted by commercialization, where only economic opportunism motivates citizens. At the top level, elites and politicians simply buy their seats for the Parliament. At the bottom, citizens sell their votes for miserable amounts of cash, faking loyalty to multiple candidates. One conclusion is that people in Kyrgyzstan

no longer believe in any ideas and ideals because people's hopes from the two revolutions have never been realized.

On the other hand, neighboring Kazakhstan has finally seen some changes in recent months. In 2019, Kazakhstan's first President Nursulstan Nazarbaev finally stepped down after three decades of power. This was a long-awaited opportunity to transition to a democracy, and it created high hopes for the country. However, the opportunity was lost as soon as it presented itself. Nazarbaev was able to smoothly transfer power to his successor President Jomart Tokaev within just three months of his resignation. The elections were described as fraud. Heated discussions on the Kazakhstan panel suggests that no changes have taken place in post-Nazarbaev Kazakhstan, and politics remain still under a highly personalistic regime that depends on a one-party and one-family ruled system.

Yet, there were some positive outcomes from the June elections. Elections mobilized Kazakh activists both online and, in the streets, and the youth and activists used creative ways of protesting and expressing their opinion. Protestors spread out anti-government quotes and slogans and social media played a crucial role.

Identity Transformations in Central Asia

A significant portion of the conference was devoted to identity transformations in Central Asia. Two questions were at the center of attention: 1) How do Central Asians define their identities? 2) Is there a common Central Asian identity?

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asian societies faced massive transformations in almost every sphere of people's lives. The shift from planned to market economy completely reversed the way people earned their living. Borders were suddenly open to cross freely. Many engaged in cross border trade travelling as far as to Turkey, and women became breadwinners. Millions of labor migrants flooded the streets of Russia and Kazakhstan. At the same time, new religious movements arrived in the region and challenged secular states and societies. It is under such circumstances Central Asians build their post-Soviet identity.

Many panelists and participants were curious if Central Asians have a shared identity. One speaker, looking at the official documents and narratives on the concept of regionalism and regionalization endeavors in Central Asia, argued that regional integration efforts have failed. This is despite the efforts made by external actors and international organizations and locally developed official narratives. The result is that Central Asian states do not rush to be integrated. Some studies have explained this by the fact that just a few decades ago they were a part of the Soviet Union, and the republics are not keen to be integrated again. On the contrary, today each and every Central Asian republic strives to distinguish its own culture and national identity. Central Asians focus more on their differences than commonalities.

This is consistent with the World Value Survey data, presented in one of the panels. According to it, in Kyrgyzstan 80% of the population are proud of their nationality, in Uzbekistan the figure is 96% and in Kazakhstan 85%. Only 21% of citizens in Kazakhstan, 34% in Kyrgyzstan and 50% in Uzbekistan associated themselves with something bigger than their countries, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States. Mostly, as the survey shows, it is the older generations nostalgic about the Soviet past who are for a bigger union of states. Many participants agreed that there is no Central Asian identity.

Each Central Asian republic has developed its own identity building mechanisms, through language, historical heroes and culture. Kazakhstan is the most advanced in terms of promoting its national identity. One speaker gave a presentation about Kazakhstan's new modernization strategy, "Ruhani zhangyru," which is an official document that aims to create a new modern Kazakh identity.

Nevertheless, based on discussions, there are some generalizations that can be made about Central Asian identity. One observation is that Central Asians tend to emphasize their local/regional identities more than their nationalities. For example, a Central Asian is more likely to say: "I am from Khujand or Termes," than "I am a Tajikistani or Uzbekistani." The World Value Survey suggests that local or regional identity is stronger among the rural populations while national identity is stronger among working and middle classes. Upper and more educated classes prefer to identify themselves more as global citizens. One interesting trend that the survey noted, in reference to Kyrgyzstan only, was that of growing individualism. In Kyrgyzstan, 46% of citizens indicated that they are not a part of a nation, but they are individuals. They did not show any strong connection to the nation or local identities.

Another insight is that Central Asians have blended identities. One panelist provided a perfect example of a profile of a Tajik migrant, who is a patriot of his country but has a Russian citizenship married to an Uzbek woman; identifies himself as a Muslim but drinks vodka and uses the shamanic tradition of burning evergreen to scare away evils from his home. Such kind of fluid identity is common in Central Asia.

Value Changes in Central Asia

Central Asians are slowly changing their values and perceptions. The World Value Survey, a global network of social scientists, conducts surveys in ninety-five countries around the world. The surveys are conducted every five years. In Central Asia they conduct surveys only in three countries: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The aim of the World Value Survey is to conduct surveys on changing values, such as tolerance, family values and similar issues.

World Value Surveys provide valuable insights on such values as social capital, trust in the society and trust in power structures, ethnic and religious tolerance, which are useful in assessing democracy in Central Asia.

One conclusion from the survey was that Central Asians have higher inner circle trust than outer circle trust. The survey found that trust in family, friends and neighbors is high in the region. This is called horizontal trust and the results are consistent with everywhere else in the world. However, people in Central Asia trust less in those who are outside of their social circles (strangers). In Kyrgyzstan, for example, only 16% of the surveyed trusted persons with whom they were not familiar before.

When looking at trust in other ethnic groups, citizens of Kazakhstan were more tolerant than those who live in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. As for religious tolerance, one third of the population in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were tolerant to those who adhere to other religions, and in Kazakhstan two thirds were tolerant. The higher ethnic and religious tolerance may relate to the ethnic composition of Kazakhstani citizens.

Another area of discussion based on the world value surveys was the attitude of Central Asians to power structures. This is called vertical trust. In Kyrgyzstan people showed low vertical trust, in particular to the police, the government and the Parliament. In Uzbekistan the vertical trust was much higher. One interpretation of such differences between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was that in more authoritarian states like Uzbekistan, citizens might feel pressured and not be honest with their replies. This is consistent with the survey results from other autocratic regimes, such as China or Azerbaijan, where people generally shy away from challenging their governments.

Despite Kyrgyzstan being considered the most democratic of all neighbors, the survey results found democracy in Kyrgyzstan as shallow and vulnerable. Seventy two percent of the population in Kyrgyzstan think that democracy is good. At the same time, 82% say that they also do not mind a strong leader, with no elections or Parliament. This tells that citizens in Kyrgyzstan are undecided about democracy and not fully committed. If democracy works, people are more likely support it, but if it doesn't, they do not mind an authoritarian leader. The percentage of those who were supportive of the army was also higher. The panelists noted that in interpreting the survey results, it is important to look at the socio-economic backgrounds of the surveyed. The rural people were more likely to vote for a strong army and leader while the urban, higher class, younger or better educated are highly supportive of a democratic regime.

Conclusion

In 2021, Central Asian Republics will celebrate their 30 years of independence. For almost three decades each republic has followed its own path of state and identity building, mixing the Soviet, western and local models of governance. One conclusion to be drawn from the conference is that despite all abandoning the Soviet regime relatively at the same period, the system changes in Central Asia took place on a varying degree at a varying pace. Kyrgyzstan went through the strongest political changes, while changes in the neighboring countries have been slow. A positive trend seems to be that political violence and turbulences in the region have decreased in comparison to 1990s. The transition of

power has been predominately peaceful in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and also in Kyrgyzstan during the 2017 Presidential elections. Yet, even in Kyrgyzstan, often referred as “the island of democracy,” democracy remains highly vulnerable and superficial.

Another general conclusion is that Central Asians societies went through immense social, economic and identity transformations over the last three decades. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Central Asians have built their distinct national identities, despite their common history, language and cultural similarities. There is no Central Asian identity and any ideas on integration and regional cooperation at the moment remain a dream project.

The conference ended on the note that democracies are the most optimal regimes because only under democratic regimes is there less violence and more resilient civic culture.

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20 - 21 September 2019

Venue: OSCE Academy in Bishkek

Friday, 20 September 2019	
<p>Welcome Speech 14:00 Introduction & Moderation</p>	<p>Dr. Alexander Wolters, Director, OSCE Academy in Bishkek</p> <p>Mr. Alexander Rosenplaenter, Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Kyrgyzstan</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Anja Mihr, DAAD Visiting Professor OSCE Academy, Bishkek</p>
Session 1	System and Regime Transformation
14:30	<p><i>Keynote: The End of the Third Wave of Democratization: Are Autocracies on the Return?</i> Prof. Wolfgang Merkel, Social Science Research Center (WZB), Berlin, Germany</p>
Discussion	
16:00	Coffee Break
Session 2	System Transformation in Central Asia
16:30	<p><i>The Role of Regionalism in Transformation: The Case of Central Asia</i> Dr. Selbi Hanova, CADAP 6 National Coordinator in Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan</p> <p><i>The Challenges for Transition and Democracy in Kazakhstan</i> Dr. Nygmet Ibadildin, Professor of Political Science, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan</p> <p><i>The Ruhani Zhangyu Case: Nararbaev's Model – Modernization of Kazakhstan's Identity</i> Dr. Diana Digol, Deputy Head of Office, OSCE Programme Office, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan</p> <p><i>Mixing the Old, the New and the Strange: Political Bricolage in Central Asia</i> Dr. Emil Dzhuraev, OSCE Academy/ American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan</p>
19:30	Reception

Saturday, 21 September 2019	
Session 3	System Transformations in Comparative Perspective
10:00	<p><i>Democracy and Populism in the Middle East: The Case of Israel</i> Prof. Mario Sznajder, Professor Emeritus, Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel</p> <p><i>Identity Transformation in Central Asia</i> Mr. Keneshbek Sainazarov, Central Asia Programs Director, Search for Common Ground, Kyrgyzstan</p> <p><i>The Role of External Powers in Central Asia: India's New Game</i> Dr. Kashif Hasan Khan, Director, Silk Road Research Center, Ala-Too International University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan</p>
12:15-14:00	Lunch Break
Session 4	Human Rights and Democratization
14:00	<p><i>The Impact of Neoliberalism on Human Rights and Democracy</i> Prof. Manfred Nowak, Secretary General, Global Campus of Human Rights, Venice, Italy</p> <p><i>System Transformation in Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan</i> Dr. Asel Doolotkeldieva, American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan</p>
15:30	Coffee Break
Session 5	Value Transformation in Central Asia
16:00	<p><i>The World Value Survey: Global Study on Values and Cultural Change. History, Methodology and Experience in Kyrgyzstan</i> Prof. Dr Christian Haerpfer, President of the World Value Survey Association; Director of Eurasia Barometer, Vienna</p> <p><i>Eurasia Barometer: Exploring Political Transformations in Eastern Europe and Post-Soviet Eurasia. Case of Kyrgyzstan</i> Dr. Kseniya Kizilova, Head of Secretariat at the World Value Survey Association; Vice-Director of Eurasia Barometer, Vienna, Austria</p>
17:30	<p><i>Concluding Keynote: Political System Transformation in Kyrgyzstan</i> Mr. Medetkan Sherimkulov, Former Speaker of the Parliament of Kyrgyz Republic, Kyrgyzstan</p>
18:30	End of Conference



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