UNDERSTANDING PEACE PROCESSES IN THE AFTERMATH OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH OF KYRGYZSTAN: THE KYRGYZ AND UZBEKS HAPPILY EVER AFTER?

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by
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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The contribution examines state peacebuilding initiatives in Kyrgyzstan, following the four-day interethnic hostility in the southern capital, Osh. Though the original triggers of the four-day hostility remain highly contested the aftermath is much clearer. This work highlights that in Kyrgyzstan, peacebuilding activities are connected to nation-building projects. Building of the new civic identity therefore has become the engine of the consolidating peace. However, identity manipulation endangers fragile peace if it is exclusionary of minorities. To this end, first, nation-building as a prerequisite to sustainable peace is briefly introduced, with particular attention being paid to identity manipulation as a key concept in building a nation. Next, the study analyzes government peacebuilding initiatives, their short-term impact and illuminates state peace activities’ connection to nation-building.

Fundamentally, this thesis argues that by the aggressive fashion of promoting a new common identity state authorities generate ethnonationalism or nationalism of exclusion. By imposing ethnic values of the larger ethnic group on other minorities, government officials harden ethnic identities of the dominated group. Hence, ethnic minorities have to defend themselves from such policies by adopting nationalism of resistance. Thus the laudable but precarious project of nation-building to build peace galvanizes potential triggers for a deeper division between the two ethnic groups.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all who helped me to complete this study. First of all, my enormous gratitude goes to my academic supervisor Dr. Emil Dzhuraev whose patience, thorough guidance and skillful supervision contributed to the generation of this thesis.

My sincere appreciation also goes to the professors of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Throughout the studying period they shared their knowledge and their ideas all of which culminated in the completion of this thesis.

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LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

SDRD – State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development of Osh and Jalal-Abad Cities

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

MP – Member of Parliament

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

USSR – The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SASGIR – State Agency for Self-Governance and Interethnic Relations

Concept – Concept for Ethnic Policy and Consolidation of Society of the Kyrgyz Republic

UNPBF – United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

WB – World Bank

PRT – Public Republican Test
INTRODUCTION

The 10th of June, 2010 was the day when brutal clashes started in Osh, the southern capital of the Kyrgyz Republic, between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that soon turned into full-fledged horrendous interethnic violence. The complex social, political and economic tensions that have been bubbling over in the South climaxed in tragic interethnic fighting. An explosion of aggression, which fell along ethnic lines, concentrated in and around the multi-ethnic city of Osh. The four-day hostility (10-14th of June, 2010) killed more than 400 people, the majority of them Uzbeks, left over 400,000 displaced persons, destroyed about 2000 buildings\(^1\) and, most importantly, deepened the ethnic division between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. This tragedy is the bloodiest episode in the contemporary national history of Kyrgyzstan.

It should be highlighted that the Uzbek community constitutes the second largest ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan after the Kyrgyz. According to the latest available data it is about 15% of the whole population (Figure 1) and 29% of the Osh oblast population.\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage of the Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungans</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyghurs</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicities</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three years have passed since the four-day inter-communal violence later known as either the “Osh events” or the “June events.” At first glance Osh seems to be stable, ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are riding together in buses, going to bazaars and visiting mosques. However, the violence that was publicly labeled as “war” has left its impact – there are no more Uzbek songs during Kyrgyz tois, which was one of the compulsory attributes of any celebration. If one goes down to the prominent bazaar there he finds a clear division between the two groups, where a Kyrgyz buyer will buy from Kyrgyz

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seller and and Uzbeks – from Uzbeks. “Before the interethnic violence of last June, Osh was a remarkable meeting point of Uzbek and Kyrgyz cultures. That Osh is no longer, but shared history provides the best hope for a peaceful future,” claims Nick Megoran.  

A basic premise of the present study is that nation-building can contribute to consolidating peace after ethnic violence – and that has been the belief behind the general direction of state efforts in post-conflict Osh. From this premise springs the goal of this paper to explore how nation-building as peace promoting project has been pursued so far. The contribution of this work is two-fold. First, it seeks to contribute an empirical discussion about the government-produced peace processes in order to illustrate their limitations, implications and short-term impact. Second, it contributes to theoretical discussion about the role of nation-building in peacebuilding processes.

Although the original triggers of the mayhem are contested, the consequent aftermath is clearer. As soon as tenuous calm settled in the South, state authorities began to engineer post-conflict activities to mitigate violence in the short-term, and build peace among the population in the long-term. These tasks are extremely problematic to implement, since government is considered to remain an un-trusted entity by the people, yet they are working on their own peacebuilding initiatives on the ground. Peace activities produced and promoted by the government have included:

- financial rewards for conclusion of inter-ethnic marriages;
- establishment of new state structures (State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development, State Agency for Self-Governance and Interethnic relations, Department for Ethnic and Religious Policy and Cooperation with Civil Society)
- development of the Concept for Ethnic Policy and Consolidation of Society in Kyrgyzstan;

First, the paper examines abovementioned state peace activities as government response to the June hostility. Then by reviewing academic literature thesis posits that nation-building by means of identity manipulation might consolidate peace. The study shows that Kyrgyzstan state authorities have chosen nation-building as a peacebuilding tool. It is critical to understand how this strategy of building peace through nation-building has been pursued so far in Kyrgyzstan.

Hence, next, the thesis analyzes the most illustrative controversial peace and nation-building activities. The thesis examines such government responses as financially rewarding ethnic intermarriages, promoting civic identity by means of Kyrgyz language, and some issues of identifying the target-groups for financial reparation. As a result, two problematic observations arise: 1) transformation of the nation-building project into nationalism of exclusion; and, in reaction to that, 2) appearance of nationalism of resistance by Uzbek ethnic group in Osh. Eventually, these issues make state peace activities counter-productive or even fuel hatred between the two ethnic communities. Belligerent nationalist elites might unconsciously plant the seeds of potential ethnic conflict in the future.

The thesis concludes by emphasizing the role of re-shaping the nation-building policy and the importance of inclusive nationalism to build peace. This contribution suggests that the most productive way of promoting a new identity would be through elite bargaining. Daniel L. Byman (2002) as well as other prominent scholars stress that elite bargain is an efficient tool that would bring success while manipulating identities.

The main analytical question of the study is “How the strategy of manipulating identities and stimulating a new – civic – identity has figured in the state peacebuilding project?”

From this main question follow sub-questions that are also addressed:

- What are the government peace initiatives?
- How have they been pursued so far?
- What are the short-term after-effects of the government peace initiatives?

**Methodology**

As can be grasped from the original goals and aims of the work, it is principally a work of qualitative analysis: it aims to answer the posed questions by describing, interpreting and critiquing the post-conflict peace processes based on available published material. Additionally, some primary data has been collected in Osh during a two-month period. A small-scale survey was conducted across Osh city population (Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Russians) to know their perception of effectiveness of government reconciliation strategies. Research sample consists of representatives of inter-ethnic couples that received financial rewards for their marriage, individual city residents, experts, and local government officials.
The contribution looks precisely on their knowledge, attitudes, experience, judgments and opinions about peace processes in the aftermath of the June events, so these are subjects of my study. The conduct of interviews with 2 interethnic couples, 7 local residents, 2 NGO’s managers, 4 experts, and 5 governmental officials further contributed to the overall picture since these numbers seem to be sufficient to grasp my expectations from the research goals. Because ethnic issues are politically sensitive in the country and because of the difficulty (practical, but also in terms of resources) of achieving a statistically representative sample, this work had to rely on snowballing as the main technique for contacting informants. Although there was the risk of having a skewed sample with groups of like-minded people recommending each other, the collected data seem to point to a reasonably varied range of opinions. Interviews were conducted in Russian, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek languages. When interviewing representatives of the Uzbek ethnic group, I was accompanied by a native Uzbek speaker. Semi-structured interviews appeared to be the most efficient type of the interview, because it allowed to cover a number of issues listed in a topic guide while at the same time it enabled the respondent to elaborate on a question which he or she deemed relevant. Interviews and related city reports are attached with the CD to the presented paper.

Finally, a critical review of existing theoretical and conceptual literature has been carried out, against which the outcomes of the empirical research on the case of post-conflict Kyrgyzstan have been assessed and critiqued. Corresponding conclusions have been drawn and proposed thereupon.

Structure
The thesis consists of three main chapters. The first chapter presents the concept of peacebuilding and different means to consolidate it. Then this part of the study explores the concept of nation-building and its important connections to that of peacebuilding. Various forms of nationalism are discussed with a view to understanding what kinds of nationalism have been observable in the case of post-conflict Kyrgyzstan. The second chapter states the problem of peace-building as it stands in Kyrgyzstan, and summarizes the government attempts in that regard. It provides evidence of the state peacebuilding initiatives and illuminates the short-term impact of those. The last and main chapter deals with the transformation of nation-building into the form of nationalism that was to
be avoided – nationalism of exclusion. To this end, the chapter selects illustrative peace initiatives to analyze the way of their “nationalization.” By discussing the impact of those initiatives, this chapter suggests that most of them are ill-thought in terms of mechanisms of implementation and design. Thus, some of those measures could trigger the most un-welcomed effect - nationalism of exclusion that galvanizes nationalism of resistance and results in possible major conflagration.

CHAPTER I:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis seeks to understand the short and long-term impacts of the post-June violence government peace initiatives in Kyrgyzstan. To that end, reviewing the growing body of academic literature that takes significant stance towards peacebuilding and nation-building will help to explore how sustainable peace can be built, and how it has been pursued so far in Kyrgyzstan. First, the chapter presents the concept of peacebuilding and different means to consolidate it. In this critical discussion, the aim is to reveal the complex, at times contradictory meanings of the concept. Second, the study explores the concept of nation-building and its important connections to that of peacebuilding. As will be discussed further in this thesis, the continuity between peacebuilding and nation-building has been clearly observable in the post-conflict initiatives in Kyrgyzstan. Third, given the prominent place of nation-building in the peacebuilding processes, one outcome or form of nation-building processes – nationalism – becomes a serious issue to be aware of. Therefore, a discussion of various forms of nationalism is provided, with a view to understanding what kinds of nationalism have been observable in the case of post-conflict Kyrgyzstan.

The Concept of Peacebuilding

Most of the existing peacebuilding theories were stimulated by An Agenda for Peace by Boutros-Ghali (1992). Although there is no common definition of peacebuilding, An Agenda for Peace defines it as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”4 As Laurent Goetschel and Tobias Hagmann argue, originally this definition served to promote

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military approach to building peace, however it later became the bedrock of government-funded peace processes. As discussed by Goetschel and Hagmann, government actors have produced numerous definitions of peacebuilding addressing different triggers of conflicts.

As it can be seen, a wide range of activities can be subsumed under peacebuilding, thus some clarifications are needed. A review of some of the most prominent peace theories shows that peacebuilding is being promoted by means of different prerequisites: state capacity or state building (Derick W. Brinkerhoff), development (Andrea Warnecke and Volker C. Franke), liberalism (Roland Paris) and others. In general, almost all existing peacebuilding theories are about international intervention in the process of building peace. However, according to Goetschel and Hagmann peacebuilding today needs re-conceptualization; instead of focusing on purely international community’s peacebuilding initiatives academics should focus on government-sponsored peace activities.

Since peace is being politicized and international community does not have any significant impact on national policy the government initiated peace processes might be the most productive, but also the most worrisome. Moreover, adapting of the internationally agreed peacebuilding blueprints to the local realities has rarely been successful (Boege et al.). Thus, Goetschel and Hagmann propagate “bureaucratic peace” with a set of rules, institutional organization and their social reproduction orchestrated by the government. Yet, they do not urge international community to step aside; on the contrary they call for active participation in terms of supporting peace by bureaucratic means.

It is obvious, that no matter which actors are implementing peace initiatives they seek to establish “positive peace.” This term was proposed and analyzed by one of the most prominent peace and conflict scholars Johan Galtung. He explored negative and positive peace, where negative refers to absence of violence whereas positive peace

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7 Ibid.
means addressing the root causes of the violence. Post-summer 2010 fragile peace in Kyrgyzstan, by Galtung, is clearly the first type of peace – negative.

In order to adequately respond to violence, Galtung proposes the “transcend” approach. He claims that this approach is holistic “with a dynamic process model relating conflict and peace.” That is similar to the medical response model. As Galtung puts it:

\[ We \text{ would demand diagnosis, analysis of the type of disease ... ('pathogens'), prognosis to explore what we might call the natural history or process of a disease...and a therapy that would list the interventions ('sanogens') ... We want a cure so as to restore health, ease, wellness; if possible by the patient himself and his immune system.}\]

This interesting association with the language of medicine also reveals the significance of the patients’ own immune systems. Thus, in the case with Kyrgyzstan it is extremely important to support government’s initiatives not only financially, but most importantly in consultative form. The co-authors of the *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* Wilfried Graf, Gudrun Kramer and Augustin Nicolescu support Galtung’s argument, claiming that “peace must be organic.” This is to say that peace initiatives must be developed within the society and “there should be ownership of peace by those who have to live with it.”

However there are also polarized theories towards peacebuilding. According to Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis foreign intervention into peacebuilding processes is vital since societies at war lost their right to govern. Building peace is a complex endeavor and as Doyle and Sambanis borrowed the words of the prophet Isaiah one would witness peace only when “the lamb lies down with the lion.” Although, they actively propagate foreign intervention the authors also flag that any peace strategy should address the local origins of hostility and the local capacities for change. Who knows more than the local residents about the local capacities than themselves?

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 143
12 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies,” 1999
Therefore, the state where the violence happened must strive for peace itself. Each conflict environment is unique and it demands individual approach. Indeed, there is no universal peacebuilding and perfect remedies. However, this is not to say that national government should sweep away all existing peace approaches. Peace theories are not only of purely academic value, they are designed to allow decision-makers to make sense of their actions.

**Nation-building to Build Peace**

In order to make sense of the national government peace initiatives this contribution posits that Kyrgyz national authorities are utilizing nation-building as an essential component of peacebuilding. An integrated community has become one of the main priorities in the aftermath of the June events. As Nick Megoran highlighted in his *Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism* since tragic violence on the south of Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz politicians call for unity of people. Indeed, almost each public speech of the President Almazbaek Atambaev starts with the issues of the national unity. “*Bolunbogulo*” (do not divide among yourselves) Atambaev exhorted, and “*El Bolunboit*” (the people will not be divided) asserted Kamchybek Tashiyev and other prominent politicians especially in the south.\(^{13}\)

In accordance with these proclamations, the Kyrgyz government’s post violence response has focused on promoting civic identity. A number of theorists have suggested that nation-building can be a strategy for resolving ethnic conflicts. It is worth to briefly overview some of the literature that has put forward such arguments.

As Donald Horowitz observes “nation-building involves reducing disparities between groups and promoting the idea of a common shared nationhood.”\(^{14}\) According to Sven Gunnar Simonsen, nation-building can contribute to peacebuilding.\(^{15}\)

For Andreas Wimmer nation-building is a model of nationalism and although nationalism is often perceived as a negative term, nationalism as a concept is in fact

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\(^{15}\) Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Nationbuilding as Peacebuilding: Racing to Define the Kosovar,” International Peacekeeping, Vol.0, No.0, Summer 2004, pp.289–311
normatively neutral. As Wimmer argues, nation-builders might choose different paths to manipulate identities:

- to push aside ethnic divisions by means of school, administration and army;
- to create grand nation through “mixture” of different cultures;
- to force assimilation;
- to use ethnic cleansing.  

As it can be noticed here, nationalism is an important political term that is often used interchangeably with nation-building. According to Eric J. Hobsbawm nationalism is a political program of the state. He uses the term nationalism as defined by Ernest Gellner: “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.”

Hobsbawm, a prominent representative of the modernist school, argues that identities can be created and manipulated by means of traditions, myths and other invented symbols. Once successfully created, identities could be turned into powerful political and emotional force. As it can be concluded Hobsbawm also utilizes the term nationalism as political agenda to manipulate identities in order to create one national entity.

The concept of nation-building as peacebuilding tool was lively discussed by Daniel L. Byman. In his *Keeping Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, Byman presents nation-building as identity-manipulating government strategy. According to the scholar, post-violence manipulation of identities measure is “value of the conflict.” Although, most students of ethnic conflict see identity manipulation as a cause of violence, Byman argues that national identity should not be neglected by policy makers. Byman writes that elites are the main contributors to the consolidation of peace, but at the same time they might plant the seeds of conflict. Thus as Byman puts it, “identity manipulation is a two-edged sword.”

The main asset of Byman’s contribution is an argument that identities can be changed, however the government should take into consideration time, resources and mechanism of changing identities. This is not to say that government should coerce people to deny their previous national identity, but to

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promote a new common identity. In order to build the new nation with common identity Byman urges to bargain with elites, since they are playing crucial role in forcing peace. He emphasizes nation-building strategy as peace tool, however it “demand[s] a price in cultural diversity.”19 Thus, author warns that nation-building or manipulating identities as means of peacebuilding requires careful approach. It should not exclude other cultural or ethnic identities. Otherwise “human mosaic will become less colorful.”20

The so-called “constructivist model” of nationalism, when identities can be reshaped in accordance with political demands was also thoroughly analyzed by Chaim Kaufmann. He highlights that identities can be manipulated, but he focuses on why identities, once they take hold, are so stable. The scholar argues that such identities are almost impossible to manipulate. Kaufmann also highlights the vital role of the political entrepreneurs in the process of reconstructing identities as peacebuilding tool. For Kaufmann, political rivalries become adroit in manipulating identities and use “hypernationalist propaganda to gain and hold power.” 21 Thereby the initial laudable goal of peacebuilding through nation-building could have a polarizing effect. Thus the author urges to work with elites – the key to peace and destruction. Creating peace after bitter hostilities is a difficult endeavor, yet keeping peace is not impossible if government chooses the right path.

The present study posits that Kyrgyzstani government has chosen (consciously or unconsciously) the nation-building policy to foster peace, thus contribution proceeds further with the concept of nationalism and nation-building focusing on literature regarding Central Asian nationalism (nation-building). Political elites of all times used notion of nation in their favor, as an efficient tool for pursuing their own territorial, economic or political goals, stirring national hatred in times when they wanted to challenge the status quo within country or to raise the masses to revolt, or when they wanted to unite people they also address “national” mood. As Carolyn Stephenson claims “nation-building matters to intractable conflict…because the building of an integrated national community is important in the building of a sustainable peace.”22

19 Ibid., p 222
20 Ibid.
The puzzle of the complex nation-building issues in Kyrgyzstan requires a brief historic detour. Eventually the answer to nation-building puzzle of Central Asian state could be found in “father of nations” head of the USSR, Joseph Stalin’s nation-building policy. As Yuri Slezkine quotes Joseph Stalin, a nation is a “historically evolved, stable community based on a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.” In this regard we can conclude that the Soviet nation-building policy was based on Stalin’s definition of the nation, though this policy lead to certain conflicts within the region. For instance, this nationalities strategy divided the region into five different states where historically societies were closely bound together. As Francine Hirsh relates, “a self-designated Turkestan émigré organization in the appeal to the UN in 1980 maintained that SU ‘has swallowed up one of the oldest nations in the world’ [West Turkestan].”

Although the task to divide the region into countries was an extremely complex task, Soviet politicians generally succeeded in creating new states and nations, which became the constituent members of the USSR. By late 1924 the Soviet regime administrators (Gosplan, Narkomnats Avel Enukidze – head of the regionalisation commission of TsIK) developed three main principles of border making – ethnographic or national, economic and “principle of administrative order.” The latter was recommended by Enukidze. This principle became a shorthand for political considerations that were very important in border deliberations in CA; indeed, it superseded the other two principles when they conflicted with all union interests.

Thereby it can be concluded that nations of Central Asia were not a result of long-term development (ethnogenesis) but were artificially created by the Soviet government with the participation of local elite. After all as it is highlighted in Slezkine’s paper, the noble goal of eliminating “backwardness” was looming behind Soviet “nation making” strategy. Thus, Slezkine quotes Stalin: “the essence of national question…consists of eliminating backwardness (economical, political and cultural)…to allow backward peoples to catch up with central Russia.” Thereby, “backward” people were let to have a room in a Soviet “communal apartment.”

23 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” p.3
25 Ibid, p. 10
26 Supra n1, p 11
27 Ibid
Artificially made countries should have been satisfied with the room they had, however “a nation can organize its life as it sees fit... nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.”\textsuperscript{28} Therefore the states began to seek freedom and independence. Even though the goal of independence may be very legitimate and lofty, decades of obedience made these countries extremely dependent and not self-sufficiency. In the early years of independence, the numerous economic and administrative problems they faced were compounded by issues of nation-building and identity.

An essential contribution to research of post-independence Kyrgyzstan’s nation-building is the work of Marlene Laruelle. In the attempt to understand the paradigm of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan, Laruelle explores the stages of the nation-building development. The author highlights that the first president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, was promoting a relatively effective ethnic policy that was completely ignored by his successor Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Thereby, Laruelle stresses that certain missteps in nation-building policy triggered the ethnic violence in June 2010.\textsuperscript{29} Among the most explicit miscalculations was the fact of neglecting the nation-building processes by the former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, during whose reign open ethnonationalists came to power. Thus, lack of any nation-building policy and previous ethnonationalist policy became the key contributing factors to the June events. Furthermore, Laruelle signals the fact that present Kyrgyzstani elites are also radicalized, thereby Kyrgyz nationalism is turning into ethnonationalism.\textsuperscript{30}

**The “Ugliest” Nationalism – Nationalism of Exclusion**

Ethnonationalism as it is defined by Valery Tishkov is the “ugliest” form of nationalism. According to him, it is an “idea and political practice based on the notion that only ethnonations...can provide the most natural and legitimate basis for a state...”\textsuperscript{31} Tishkov highlights “national belonging” and “service to nation” as the most authoritarian components of ethnonationalism due to the fact that it presupposes elites that are able to interpret the national interests. Indeed, by adopting ethnosymbolic approach to build nation Kyrgyzstani elites manipulate myths and other symbols to

\textsuperscript{28} Supra n1, p14
\textsuperscript{29} Marlene Laruelle, “The paradigm of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Evolving narrative, the sovereignty issue, and political agenda,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45 (2012) 39-49
\textsuperscript{30} ibid
their own ends. Thus the way of nation-building transformation depends on national decision-makers.

The theme of ethnosymbolism was taken up by Anthony D. Smith who proposed the idea that traditions, memories, symbols and myths are the main contributors in building nation. Smith considers national symbols to be more potent than ideology or other strategies. As discussed by him, the intelligentsia are the inventors of nationalism, since they can build bridges between past and present, between myths and their modern interpretation in a viable political agenda. It is traceable in Smith’s contribution that nationalism might reframe the existing myths, symbols of identities and historical memories by adding new facts to the common identity. To borrow Smith’s terms, the Kyrgyz intelligentsia should build those bridges in order to promote common identity and consolidate peace.

Rogers Brubaker also supports the vital role of elites, thus he differentiates types of decision-makers: coercive nationalizers, inductive nationalizers, laissez-faire nationalizers and pluralists (passive and active). According to this classification, coercive nationalizers share the ideal of the state where all peoples belong to one identity. To do so they utilize authoritative and “allocative” measures, offering employment for those who speak titular nation’s language or make language a requirement for citizenship. By contrast, inductive nationalizers shape national policy by means of incentive creation. Supporters of this idea believe that creation of favorable conditions to learn the language is better than imposing it. For instance, one of the tools of inductive nationalizers is free language instruction. As regards pluralists, they are active proponents of cultural pluralism. They believe that the process of nationalization should flow naturally, without any external assistance. As it is observed in case with Kyrgyzstan, national authorities tend to choose the path and pace of the coercive nationalizers. These nationalizers can galvanize two contrasting nationalisms.

Scholars tend to distinguish between positive and negative nation-building, nationalism of inclusion and exclusion, rational and irrational. In general, all those theories are bringing to fore the fact that government can practice nationalism of exclusion or inclusion. There is little agreement about what type Kyrgyzstan’s nationalism is. While Anna Matveeva warns that nationalism of Kyrgyzstan is its curse,

Nick Megoran urges to understand Kyrgyz nationalism and to respond adequately. Basically, Megoran flags the initial goal of uniting all peoples under one sustained roof. Nationalism could become such if instead of criticizing it the international community would support and propagate the Kyrgyz path of nation-building. Thus nation-building can evolve in the form of ‘nationalism of inclusion’ when minority’s rights are recognized and national government does its best to create favorable conditions for its minorities. Or in contrast, nation-building could become radicalized and turn into nationalism of exclusion, where minorities’ rights are suppressed.34

This thesis argues that nation-building in Kyrgyzstan is becoming radicalized by means of the ill-thought mechanisms and initiatives to unite the Kyrgyzstani society. Kyrgyzstan in its attempts to “ethnify” the nation by means of promoting language, propagating common origins and building symbolic monuments, is breaking the fragile frame of the nationalism of inclusion. Roeder labels the process of “ethnifying” as “an attempt to constrain the present and the future by a myth about the past.”35 As for Kyrgyzstan’s efforts of building nation, they are turning into ethnonationalism.

For Ashutosh Varshney “in the nationalism of exclusion, a dominant group within a society—domestic or foreign—seeks to impose its own values on the various other groups within that society or seeks to exclude, sometimes violently, other ethnic groups from the portals of power.”36 According to Varshney “the sons of the soil” enforce their language, religion, or culture. This imposing of own values galvanizes nationalism of resistance, when a subordinated ethnic group opposes such a move toward them and seeks to preserve its cultural identity and resist the hegemony of the titular group.

As Vladimir Fedorenko points out, ethnic nationalism is the most “convenient and capable means of providing a sense of stability by uniting majority group around the common and powerful link of ethnicity,”37 However, while ethnic nationalism provides the majority group a sense of belonging to the nation, it has a directly opposite effect on the minority ethnic groups: they do not easily embrace this new national identity and easily may feel excluded from the nation building process. Moreover, the

34 Supra n. 12
36 Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Nationality,” p 2
larger ethnic group realizes its dominant position and often treats minorities unjustly. This creates tension and conflicts among the different ethnic groups.

As prominent ethnic conflict scholar Kaufmann stresses, a new identity is often imposed by the opposing group. Kaufmann quotes a Bosnian Muslim teacher, who lamented that they never had thought of themselves as Muslims, they identified themselves as Yugoslavs. However, when they were murdered because of their identity, everything changed. As Kaufmann’s respondent puts it “the definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers.”38 As it can be grasped, Kaufmann signals that ethnic violence itself hardens the identity perceptions of a country’ different identity groups. The same point of view is shared by Tishkov, when he argues that imposition of a new identity upon people who recently suffered pain can trigger the ugliest side of nationalism.39 Therefore, usually victims tend to reject any strategies promoted by the group of violators.

Perhaps, that was the argumentation that led Wimmer to label identity manipulation (nation-building) as “nation-destroying.”40 To be sure, not all nation-building projects were successful in terms of re-building peace. To the contrary, Wimmer gives a brief overview of the radicalization of the nation-building policy into ethnic cleansing. This may happen in an overwhelming desire to build sustained homogeneous society. Thus, the engineering of a national unity is a very delicate process requiring careful judgments and accurate decisions, otherwise instead of creating nation-wide unity it could appear to be divisive and, hence, counterproductive.

To conclude, this thesis proposes that a proper understanding of the task of peacebuilding requires us to realize the strong linkage between peacebuilding and nation-building, and once that is realized, we also must also recognize the serious risks posed by various forms of nationalism that get activated in the process of nation-building. Some important academic literature, as reviewed above, alerts us to these important issues. Especially, this literature helps to understand how the otherwise laudable idea of nation-building can lead to a nationalism of exclusion, instead of nationalism of inclusion. This study hypothesizes that Kyrgyzstan has been predominantly on the path of radical nationalism of exclusion. If that is found to be correct, then as Varshney writes in paraphrasing Hobbes, such brutal nationalism can

38 Supra n.21, p. 12  
39 Supra n. 31, p. 231  
40 Supra n.16, p. 337
promote loneliness, nastiness, and brutishness,\textsuperscript{41} and this danger is in urgent need of being understood in Kyrgyzstan.

This chapter illuminates the nexus of peacebuilding with nation-building. For Buotros-Ghali the process of consolidating peace is an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” As it was indicated by Megoran and Laruelle the certain weakness of national identity was the most crucial contributor to the June 2010 bloodshed. Therefore, if building peace is a search for and support of peace-promoting structures, then in case with Kyrgyzstan, structures and institutions that express a strong and inclusive national identity are the ones being sought. The tricky part of the task then is to steer clear of falling in the trap of “the ugliest”, ethnic form of nationalism.

Thus numerous factors, contexts and processes should be taken into attention while analyzing the impact of nation-building as post-violence instrument to consolidate peace. A thorough analysis of the government response to the June events is vital in determining the applicability and legitimacy of nation-building strategy as peacebuilding instrument. The further analysis of the government post-violence peacebuilding measures provides us with an accurate depiction of the peace activities as nation-building policy. Thus the following chapter analyzes government response to the Osh events.

\textsuperscript{41} Supra n.36, p 7
CHAPTER II:
NATION-BUILDING TO BUILD PEACE: POST-JUNE TRAGEDY
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

The abovementioned theoretical discussions demonstrate the link between nation-building projects and peacebuilding. As illuminated there are prominent theorists who explore the impact of the nationalism on consolidation of peace. For instance, Wimmer observes that many state elites embarked upon nation-building project, though nationalism is an ambitious project to consolidate peace. At the present time absolutely different Uzbek and Kyrgyz narratives of grievance and victimhood require productive strategies to be undertaken in order to be erased. Otherwise, the narrative would impede any possibility of building peace and constructing civic identity. This chapter seeks to understand the government response to the June tragedy and posits that the Kyrgyz government has chosen the most ambitious way of consolidating peace – nation-building. Although in most of the cases nation-building as a peacebuilding strategy is neglected, Solomon and Matthews – along with many others cited above – argue that nation-building as a project to consolidate people can contribute to peacebuilding.

Re-constructing identity is a tough task. As Kaufmann notes, premature attempts to re-shape identities of the injured persons can barely be successful (1996). However Megoran emphasizes that if the post-conflict nation-building is of inclusive nature the project would eventually bring the desired results. Hence it is extremely important to work on the creation of the common national identity as a prerequisite of the sustainable peace. As Melis Myrzakmatov, the mayor of Osh, argues the violence of 2010 deescalated because “people realized that they were killing the brother nation and damaging their home city.”

Albeit a fragile peace was achieved in the few months following the June tragedy, there is no complete restoration of peaceful environment. In the aftermath of June of 2010, the society of Kyrgyzstan has witnessed arbitrary detentions, tortures, and random violence. There is potential threat that any conflict could turn into large-scale ethnic violence. For instance a recent conflict situation in Uzgen (Osh province) when a small skirmish could turn into larger ethnic clashes has demonstrated the fragility of

42 Supra n.15
43 Interview with mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov (May 2013, Bishkek)
stability. The ongoing tensions and distrust between two ethnic groups and the state suggest that something is wrong with the peacebuilding politics in violence- rent Kyrgyzstani society.

This study proposes that the central government’s response to the enormous challenge of building peace has had two kinds or directions. The first has been about building and promoting the civic identity. The second has been about material issues: reconstructing infrastructure and financial reparation of the victims’ sufferings. The two kinds or directions of government efforts are not necessarily ranked in order of priority; rather, this distinction is proposed only for organizing the discussion of these efforts below. The recent initiatives such as rewarding of interethnic marriages, numerous investigation commissions, establishment of new institutions and others will be discussed as representative of the first kind of peace efforts. Reconstruction of houses, building new apartment blocks, provision of loans and financial remuneration will be analyzed as representative of the second kind of peace activities.

**Peace “Enterprising” Concept**

To respond to the consequences of the June tragedy national government has developed a range of various peace measures. Thus within two months after June events President Roza Otunbaeva initiated the establishment of the presidential apparatus’ Department for Ethnic and Religious Policy and Cooperation with Civil Society, headed by Mira Karybaeva. It was the first significant institutional step toward building peace, however it was not as effective as it was expected. So far the most prominent outcome of the institution’s three-year work is the Concept for Ethnic Policy and Consolidation of Society in Kyrgyzstan (Concept), finally adopted on 18 March, 2013.

However, it should be highlighted that documents such as this Concept had been developed in Kyrgyzstan before the June events too. Thus the first Concept of Ethnic Development was adopted by the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan in January 2004, the laws “On Ethnic Development” and “Of Ethnic Minorities” were designed between 2003 and 2006. These documents as well as the later adopted Concept were stressing the role of other ethnic groups in the development of the country. However, as it can be

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45 Kontsepsiya Ukrepleniya Edinstva Naroda I Mejetnicheskih Otnosheniy v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike, p 8
seen, there was little to no effect of the previous Concepts on building interethnic unity.

The main goal of the new Concept is promoting the idea of “Kyrgyz Jarany” (Citizen of Kyrgyzstan). As it can be seen, the most valuable document in terms of consolidating peace and stability stresses identity manipulation. It is accurately calling for reframing personal identity from ethnic to civic. According to Byman and other constructivist theorists, identity manipulation is a potent instrument in building a new nation.46 However the success of such discourse depends on “nationalizers” that can promote more benign and boundary-transcending, inclusive identity. In this case minorities might have to adopt a larger identity, and “ethnic antagonism would fade away.”47 It can be grasped that the Kyrgyz government is trying to re-shape society’s identity from ethnic to civic, thus it can be concluded that the Concept is the tool of nation-building - prerequisite of peace.

To achieve the goal of promoting new identity “Kyrgyz Jarany” the Concept utilizes the well-known instruments such as language, education, culture and others. These tools of promoting civic identity tend to become the focal contributor to settle the consequences of the violence. In the framework of the Concept the working group consisting of wide-range specialists has developed the Plan of implementation of the main guideline of interethnic peaceful co-existence 2013-2017. Moreover, the Concept’s most prominent product has become the establishment of the State Agency for Self-governance and Interethnic Relations (State Agency/SASGIR).

State Structures to Build Peace
As the Head of Department for ethnic and religious politics, Mira Karybaeva claims the newly established State Agency for Self-Governance and Interethnic Relations was developed as the first step of the Concept’s realization. The intention behind the uniting self-governance and interethnic relations affairs in one agency was to make the all-important preventive work more effective. It is commonly known that most conflict situations break out due to some local catalysts. Thus the reasoning behind uniting those notions in one state institute is sound.

Although institution-building for effective public services in the post-conflict settings is extremely important, such institutions should be dynamic and efficient in order to achieve their original goals. James Katorobo discusses the establishment of new institutions as a contributor to peacebuilding. He highlights that none of them succeeded in meeting their original goal, arguing that “lack of institutional vision, goals and strategies” causes their inefficiency.\(^{48}\) Therefore it is extremely important to understand the planned mechanism of work and the goals of the newly established agency.

The counselor of the State Agency Omurbek Almanbetov stresses that creation of the Agency is the most important step in implementation of the Concept. Basically, it was developed in order to improve interethnic relations and to implement the blueprint for strengthening ethnic accord. The noble initial goal seems to justify establishment of this institution as the main peacebuilding instrument. The Agency was established to promote the minorities’ rights, the equal rights of the citizens of the country and to strengthen the early warning system through close collaboration with the local self-governance institutions.

However, besides certain advantages of the creation of such state institution there are more tangible disadvantages. The first to mention is the institution’s complex system of information transformation. It begs unpacking: the counseling offices that are gathering all relevant information have to send their recommendations to the regional state agency’s department (1), which sends it to central apparatus in Bishkek (2) and the latter forwards them to the Interdepartmental Commission (3) that will coordinate the work in order to resolve the issue and send their recommendations back to the local administration (4). This clumsy complexity of the system and its dubious efficiency may badly impact the work of the institution. Subsequently the Agency may turn into a huge bureaucratic machine instead of being an interactive and dynamic institution.

To compound the aforementioned concerns about Agency’s viability, an international expert has labeled the agency a “dead born child.”\(^{49}\) As the expert puts it, albeit the original goal of building the new institution is superior and ideally it should work to strengthen interethnic relations and to promote civic identity, in practice it does not have any credentials or capacities. Therefore, the institution with no efficient

\(^{48}\) Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict State Capacity: Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Post Conflict Countries (2009), p 41
\(^{49}\) Interview with the international expert, Artem Aznaurian (Osh, July 2013)
mandate to solve the real issues is either an attempt to build peace by bureaucratic means or just an ostentatious way of proving that the Kyrgyz government tries to consolidate peace. For Collier “capacity needs to be built on what already exist,” thus this commendable preventive measure could have become more effective if its functions were allocated to the local municipalities.

Thus, the new institution – set up as an instrument to monitor and prevent any ethnic tensions - is just a container without content. To paraphrase Matteo Fumagalli, formal state institutions are not panacea to preserving the peace. Yet, Agency is not the only structure to address the ethnic tensions. The government also established a special directorate responsible for reconstruction and development of the damaged cities, and the following pages take up the discussion of this directorate.

Financial Reparation of the Victims’ Suffering

As it is now commonly accepted, the bloody June events took away over 400 lives, left thousands injured, and still more with destroyed houses and businesses. All victims deserve adequate reparation, which includes material and immaterial aspects. While the immaterial dimension of the reparation such as restoration of the documents, giving death certificates and others were provided by the international organizations, state elites focused on financial reparation of the peacebuilding agenda. As David Bloomfield points out the act of payment of compensation is an evidence of state’s willingness to grant “recognition of the wrong done and to make good the losses suffered.” Bloomfield distinguishes different kinds of damages and adequate compensations. Thus each kind of damage demands sufficient financial reparation: nominal - symbolic amount of money, pecuniary - should represent the closest possible financial equivalent to the suffering or loss, moral damages - immaterial harm, such as humiliation, harm to a person’s dignity, and the last, punitive damages - intended to

50 Paul Collier, “Building Capacity in Post-Conflict Countries,” Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction № 14  p 4
51 Matteo Fumagalli, “Informal (ethno-)politics and local authority figures in Osh, Kyrgyzstan,” June 2007, p 24
punish. Kyrgyzstan utilized all range of different compensations according to the type of damage.

The latest data shows that for the incomplete 2013 alone about 690 million KGS were allocated as compensational payment to the victims of the June events. The amount of money varies due to the scale of the damage and suffering. Though it is difficult to measure someone’s suffering, the national government allocated a fixed amount of money for various kinds of damage. For instance, 1 million KGS (20 830 USD) are paid to the families where one or more persons were killed; in other cases it varies from 50 thousand and 100 thousand KGS. The government also pays 3700 KGS to 228 people as monthly allowances. 54

According to Bloomfield “collective measures will be necessary to deal with past abuses adequately.” 55 In Kyrgyzstan’s post-conflict efforts, collective measures are reflected in the fixed remuneration for the victims of June events and housing of victims. To this end Kyrgyzstan established the State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development of Osh and Jalal-Abad Cities (SDRD). It should be noted that the funding of SDRD was provided by international donors. Even so, the SDRD is emphasized by Atambaev as one of the core components of the peacebuilding efforts by the country. 56

It was established to reconstruct damaged cities and “promote interethnic reconciliation and dialogue after the tragic June events.” 57 As it can be seen this Directorate’s main goal was to build new apartment houses for the people affected by the June events and support the restoration of social and cultural values. The construction began in August 2010, and in four months the Directorate could hand over some new buildings. However, the houses were labeled as “wishy washy” by the local residents and some of the authorities. As Vice-Mayor of Osh, Taalaibek Sabirov stated that those houses were built in a rapid fashion and people who were building them were not professionals. 58

55 Supra n. 53., p. 158
57 “Good Will Initiative: There’s Enough Happiness for All,” UNDP website, (accessed July 30, 2013)
58 “Osh Mayor’s office: Housing for victims of ethnic conflict of June 2010 is substandard,” Kloop.kg (accessed July 23, 2013)
Albeit the rapid fashion of building the new houses is easy to understand, state officials are also not satisfied with the executed work of the SDRD. For instance, the MP Nazarali Aripov even proposed to investigate the SDRD activities since the Directorate has not finished constructing of few houses and he also flagged the bad quality of the new apartments. To respond the criticism of the newly built houses former director-general of the SDRD, Jantoro Satybaldiev claimed that:

\[ \text{People] are different. Some want an apartment with Euro fittings. But these are rent-free apartments given over by the state, repairs can be made at their own discretion.}^{59} \]

The latest data (October, 2012) illustrates that the Directorate has reconstructed 92 objects (hospitals, schools, kindergartens), 34 new houses in the city of Osh, among those 25 were put in commission.\(^{60}\) To allocate the flats in the new houses a special State Commission was established, consisting of twelve people of different backgrounds. The main principle of organizing their work was to accommodate people of different ethnic groups together. Those apartments and money were handed out as compensation for the damages and losses.

Finally, according to the official data the SDRD was liquidated in January, 2013 due to “the optimization of state services programme and Directorate’s inadvisability.”\(^{61}\) The state institution was liquidated without briefing of the results of its work and reporting about the resources spent on the reconstructing and development of Osh and Jalal-Abad cities. SDRD’s inadvisability means that everything was restored and those cities are well developed now. However, unfortunately the hidden neighborhoods such as Cheremushki and houses along street after Navoi are still in ruins. These ruins are reminders of the four-day hostility and barely can contribute to peaceful co-existence.

Besides SDRD, the city appearance depends from the local municipality. Thus Osh city administration also works on erasing negative memories of the city residents. Moreover, they have also designed and implemented variety of peace initiatives. The following sub chapter depicts the local administration’s peace activities and discusses their nexus with nation-building.

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\(^{59}\) Ibid.


**Sub-National Response**

One of the most recurring issues of the numerous reports and articles has been the role played by the Osh city municipality, and of Mayor of Osh Melis Myrzakmatov in particular. Immediately after the de-escalation of the violence, Osh municipality started to develop its own range of peace measures. The first order measures are devoted to promoting tolerance and peaceful coexistence. The second ranked peace activities are construction of schools, kindergartens, children’s playgrounds and, most notably, of monuments. This part of the chapter addresses the tight nexus between peacebuilding and nation-building projects of the city municipality.

Most of the city peacebuilding activities were built around declaration of 2011 as “The year of strengthening the relations, concordance and friendship between ethnic groups in the city of Osh.” In the framework of this project such measures as timely service delivery (healthcare, education and administration of the city), raising awareness of people, promoting tolerance and sports, in addition to such controversial initiative as financially rewarding interethnic marriages were implemented. With regards to interethnic marriages, despite exaggerated numbers of rewarded marriages by Myrzakmatov himself (58 couples) or mass media (200 couples), only two couples of newlyweds were rewarded with 100 thousand KGS (a bit more than 2 thousand USD).\(^62\)

The core instrument of the promoting tolerance was close cooperation with Mass Media. For instance, most of the propagandistic articles and interviews were published in the Mayor’s Office controlled newspapers (Osh Shaamy) and social videos were broadcasted by means of the local TV (Osh TV is also considered as Myrzakmatov’s TV channel). Put additionally a number of the joint social campaigns were organized and sponsored by the local municipality: “The Garden of Friendship” (two ethnic groups together plant trees) “Let Nooruz Come to the Kyrgyz Land and Friendship Spread around” (joint celebration of the Nooruz in different mono-ethnic neighborhoods), and numerous Friendship Festivals. In addition, city municipality established 12 Territorial Youth Committees that should work with the youth of the city and suburban territories on raising awareness and promoting tolerance.\(^63\) Moreover even public transportation is used for propaganda of peace (see the illustration in the appendix).

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\(^62\) Osh City report 2011, see in the Appendix C

\(^63\) Ibid
A key and the most tangible activity, much discussed by observers, is the construction of symbolic monuments around Osh. In two years (2011 - 2012) millions of KGS were spent on building monuments of the prominent Kyrgyz historical figures such as Barsbek (in Zapadniy microregion inhabited mostly by Kyrgyz) and Alymbek Datka (in Furkat inhabited by Uzbeks). It is reported that 31 million KGS were spent only for the construction of the monument to folklore hero Manas (in Nariman village inhabited by Uzbeks), who can become a symbol of interethnic cooperation and peace. Aforementioned monuments are clear symbols of the Kyrgyz glorious past and national unity. As Myrzakmatov has stressed, through building a nation and a sense of patriotism, city municipality is building peace. Furthermore, besides constructing monuments of historical political and military leaders of the Kyrgyz, city administration initiated construction of “Bell of Peace” and “Mothers’ Tears” monuments. Both are in the center of Osh city. It is commonly known that reflection of the past in present time is an instrument of nation-building.

As for the building of the social objects, according to the local authorities the center of their attention became upbringing of youth in patriotic mood. Thus they initiated construction of schools and kindergartens. Though, the construction itself barely can contribute to the evoking of the patriotism in young generation. The other implication of the constructing such social objects is insecurity of leaving neighborhoods by the local residents (Amir-Temur, where the kindergarten was built), thus parents could leave their children in the closest kindergarten or school. The other project that is under consideration at present time is building of the local police station and post-office in the distanced neighborhoods of Osh.

The intention of resettlement of the mono-ethnic neighborhoods is being discussed by some of the local authorities. This idea is being initiated in order to build poly-ethnic livelihoods that would enhance mutual collaboration and improve interethnic relations since young ages. However Kaufmann persuades his readers that resettlement often causes loss of lives. Indeed people feel themselves safer when they

66 Interview with Melis Myrzakmaov (May, 2013)
67 Interview with the Mayor’s Office specialist, Guljan Altymyshova (June, 2013)
are in a cozy environment with familiar neighbors next door. Kaufmann argues that if people for ages were living in a way they are living today in terms of compact livelihoods, they should continue in that way further.68

The other reforms regarding youth were about education. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek University, established in the 1990s, changed its name to the Osh State Social University. Likewise Uzbek Pedagogical-Humanities Faculty of the Osh State University was also downgraded to a department of the university’s philology faculty. In 2011 the Mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, reportedly announced that most of the Uzbek-language schooling in the city should be stopped. Although, to reform education or better to say improve it is an important step in building civic identity and promote tolerance the government focuses on the language issues instead of adding some valuable classes on tolerance. The importance of education after any kind of conflicts was discussed by Blakkisrud and Nozimova. According to them education as a nation-building strategy is an efficient project.69 In the end children who witnessed violence could become people who would save country as well as adults who could destroy it.

As it can be seen, summary and analysis of the post-violence government’s wide-range peace initiatives cannot be observed without understanding them in the relation to nation-building. Chapter describes the most prominent peace measures and reveals that most of them are devoted to promote national unity and civic identity. With understanding of the post-tragedy response, it becomes clear that national government stresses on nation-building as a prerequisite of the sustainable peace. To do so national authorities try to manipulate identities, to coerce or cajole people of Kyrgyzstan to adopt civic identity rather than ethnic.

It can be grasped that the Kyrgyz government sees the threat in disintegrated society, thus the national government recognizes the menace and tries to implement an adequate response. Although the laudable goal is looming behind all of these peace and nation-building initiatives the present situation is volatile and hardly predictable. Thus the ongoing policy of the national government is vital: it can fuel tensions as well as accommodate it. In this regard the key contributors are the local elites, and as Daniele Conversi stresses that politicians might use “manipulating public feelings and identities

68 Supra n.21
for the only purpose of holding on to power.” It can be grasped that though the peace or nation-building strategies are properly designed, the “nationalizers” might manipulate them as they want to. Politicians, seeking for own benefits and meeting their ambitions, might engineer the crucial mechanism of turning nation-building into radical ethnonationalism and harden nationalism of resistance by the subordinated groups. In this regard some of the most controversial government initiatives need unpacking and closer discussion to understand the triggering factors that might evoke ethnonationalism and, hence, nationalism of resistance. The following chapter thoroughly analyzes the short-term impact of some of the peace events.

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CHAPTER III:
NATIONALISM OF EXCLUSION TRIGGERING NATIONALISM OF RESISTANCE

The nation-building as a prerequisite of peacebuilding is an ambitious and exigent task. Although it may be effective in terms of ending ethnic tensions and consolidating peace, it is a “two-edged sword.” Thus it might trigger the crucial and ugly form of nationalism – ethnonationalism or nationalism of exclusion. This chapter will not be exhaustive; it illustrates the most obvious peace and nation-building government activities as liable to nationalism. The following part argues that nation-building strategies are generating ethnonationalism which in turn prompts nationalism of resistance. As highlighted by Varshney, hypernationalism promoted by the “sons of the soil” plants the seeds of hardening of the resistance by the dominated group. Varshney labels this phenomenon as nationalism of resistance, arguing that it is an adequate choice of the subordinated group. Hence, the Concept for Ethnic Policy and Consolidation of Society in Kyrgyzstan (Concept), the rewarded interethnic marriages, and the monuments and miscalculations of the SDRD are selected as the most illustrative state measures providing evidence of the ethnonationalism.

Obviously, it is crucial for modern “nationalizers” to promote a sense of homeland for the people. Hobsbawm is rightly concerned to explain that it is extremely important to take into attention the view from below, i.e. “the nation as seen not by governments and the spokesmen…, but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda.” After all, as Hobsbawm argues the official ideologies of the national government are not necessarily guides to what in minds of the state citizens. At this point Byman emphasizes identity manipulation as an instrument to bind people emotionally and politically with the state.

In respect of state identity manipulation Byman differentiates components of the successful identity building: culture, interethnic marriages, mass education and language. The previous chapter provides evidence of the bridging of peacebuilding and nation-building in case of post-June events Kyrgyzstan. Obviously the ultimate goal of all government initiatives is sustainable peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic groups

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71 Supra n. 16
72 Supra n. 36
73 Supra n. 17, p. 11
of Kyrgyzstan. As it was highlighted in the address of President Almazbek Atambaev in honor of triennial of the June events that was delivered by means of the newspapers and news agencies the main priority today is national unity. Yet, the impact of nation-building as peacebuilding prerequisite needs thorough analysis. This chapter attempts to understand transformation of the laudable nation-building policy into hypernationalism. To be more precise, this chapter explores how nation-building shifts into nationalism of exclusion or as Tishkov puts it ethnonationalism that in turn evokes nationalism of resistance.

The Rise of Ethnonationalism

For Melvin, successful conducting of the constitutional referendum and subsequent parliamentary elections are contributors to restoration of relative normalcy. However, he clarifies that this positive political development is not an evidence of “return of stability to the country.” Though referendum and adopting of the new Constitution are not directly related to the government responses, they are interesting in terms of the consequential parliamentary elections. Moreover, these events contribute to this study with regards to the fascinating connotations with ethnic violence of 2010.

The Constitution of 2010 has changed the form of the state rule to a parliamentary regime and according to the request of the minorities’ representatives rephrased the statement “Kyrgyz people” to “the people of Kyrgyzstan.” This amendment has a colossal meaning in terms of bringing forth the importance of reshaping people’s identity. In order to implement the focal amendment to the Constitution that is to set in place the mechanism of parliamentary democracy, the interim government decided to conduct legislature elections in October, 2010. The outcome was unpredictable: ethno-nationalist party “Ata-Jurt” collected 9 percent of the all votes and as a consequence received 28 mandates in the parliament that is more than any other party. As it can be concluded the Constitution and the elections eventually reinforced the party with an explicit ethno-nationalistic component.

75 Ibid
Moreover, Anna Matveeva doubts “that the majority of citizens fully realized what they were voting for, since the results of the social polls and the referendum hardly match.” The results of the social poll are clearly seen in the diagram.

Figure 2. The results of the poll conducted on the eve of the referendum

Despite the highlighted tendencies on the eve of the referendum, adoption of the Constitution was supported by majority of the population. Perhaps, this incongruence highlights the fact that people did not comprehend what they were voting for. This paper utilizes the analysis of the premature elections to explain the reinforcing of the most ethno-nationalistic party “Ata-Jurt.”

Elections is an instrument of promoting democracy, however as Paris stresses elections and “democratic ferment” are not needed in the immediate post-conflict period. Paris highlights that “it is likely that political parties [immediately following the violence] will replicate the same lines of division that defined the conflict.” That was eventually mirrored in Kyrgyzstan: the premature elections resulted in victory of the openly nationalistic “Ata-Jurt” party. As Marlene Laruelle enumerates the evidences of the party’s ethnonationalist bias, she highlights the obligatory courses on the history of Kyrgyz ethnicity proposed by the party and Ata-Jurt’s website that is designed and decorated “with clichéd pictures of ‘Kyrgyzness.’” Yet, their ethnonationalist bias was widely supported during elections and saliently represented by the former leader of the party Kamchybek Tashiev. Thus he proclaims the following:

*The titular nation must be superior; it cannot be inferior to the other ethnicities in the country. These latter must respect our tradition, our language, our history, and then*

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77 Ibid., p 8
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid, p 11
81 Ibid.
everyone will live in peace. But if ethnic groups in our country... say that they are equal with the Kyrgyz or superior to them, then the state will collapse. ...

It can be grasped that the bloody interethnic clashes of June 2010 have left significant imprint on national politics, accelerating already increasing nationalistic sentiments. For instance, Emil Kaptagayev, former Head of Staff of the provisional government, expressed his disappointment with the product of the “western society” – Constitution of 2010 because it did not state clearly that the state is a state of the Kyrgyz and the particular role of the Kyrgyz ethnic group was not highlighted appropriately. Such kind of criticism might be reflected by the society, thus nationalistic moods will spread around. “It should be written in the constitution that Uzbeks should respect us,” a Kyrgyz woman demanded from Otunbayeva at an Osh referendum rally. These claims were widely spread in the immediate aftermath of the June events and they resulted in the following nationalism of exclusion by the Kyrgyz ethnic group and nationalism of resistance by the Uzbeks.

Constitution guarantees equal rights of all ethnic groups for access to the state positions. Yet, giving a quick glance on the Kyrgyz political elite, it can be seen that it is almost monoethnic, the key figures and positions belong to Kyrgyz. The subordinated group has only symbolic posts such as deputy heads of regional or local administrations and other second- or third-rank positions. As token representatives they do not have any decision making mandate. However, the role of at least symbolic representation in the decision-making structures might positively impact on identity manipulation. Byman traces the role of the token representative in Morocco’s national government as an asset of the nation-building policy in Morocco. This conscious or unconscious policy of exclusion is exaggerating the negative state of Uzbeks towards government. Wimmer flags that the privileged access “to the state that some ethnic groups…enjoy is mirrored in exclusion of others.”

It can be concluded that in the case of Kyrgyzstan, post-violence radical political reforms in a rapid fashion was not a proper strategy since “nationalism... for the time being, [has become] an inescapable context to politics in the republic.” Thus as Paris argues, “Creating a bit of space and time after the end of a conflict may permit

82 Ibid.
83 Supra n. 29, p. 17
84 Ibid., p. 24
85 Supra n 18
86 Supra n. 14, p. 336
87 Supra n.13, p. 2
a new kind of politics to develop.”88 However, state authorities chose another path and pace when legislature elections led to the radicalization of nationalism and interchanging of patriotism with ethnonationalism. Following pseudo patriotic sentiments of protecting representatives of own ethnicity might turn into large-scale ethnic confrontation. According to one of the international experts the radicalization of nationalism is natural under the condition of inability of the state to provide people with basic need – security.89 Thus they have to seek for own methods of securing themselves and their families – nationalism of defense (resistance).

Whereas Kyrgyz nationalism is aggressive in imposing its values on subordinated groups, Uzbek nationalism turns into nationalism of resistance. This phenomenon is discussed very well by Kaufmann. He argues that people who suffered violence harden their identity and usually are not so eager to adopt a new one.90 Respondents of Uzbek ethnicity look with great sympathy toward Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz authorities do not enjoy much respect amongst Uzbeks of Osh.91 Wimmer also warns that an aggressive way of promoting new identity in fact makes other ethnic groups to defend themselves.

However it should be noted that elections themselves did not trigger nationalization of the society, it served as an indicator of the overwhelming nationalistic sentiments among population. At the present nation-building is turning into ethnonationlism of both acting sides: Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. This risky project of identity manipulation is being realized by means of the Concept. The following sub-chapter explores the implications of the Concept in promoting new identity and its potential risks of radicalizing nationalism.

**Kyrgyz Jarany: Promoting Civic Identity?**

For most of the nationalism scholars identity manipulation is one of the most effective but ambitious projects. Hobsbawm differentiates two types of nationalisms civic nationalism and ethnic or linguistic nationalism, if the first one is promoted top-down, the second is bottom up. Obviously, the national government promotes the first type of nationalism that relies on civic identity. To achieve this goal, Kyrgyzstan’s government developed basic framework of implementing civic identity - the Concept. It spotlights a

88 Supra n. 80, p. 5 (771)
89 Interview by Skype with the conflict scholar and practitioner (August 2013, Scotland)
90 Supra n. 21
91 Personal Observation (Osh city, 2013)
commitment to seeing Kyrgyzstan as a multicultural and multilingual consolidated society, yet citizens should be united under one common civic entity – Kyrgyz Jarany.

Although, it is too early to judge about the impact of the Concept, experts are not so positive about the document. For instance, Head of the local NGO Avazkan Ormonova argues that “This artificial document that was designed by the government would not have any efficient effects. It will not reach ordinary people. The government is doing it just to do something.”92 Another respondent, the chairman of the Center of the International Protection, Akylbek Tashkulov is also pessimistic about the future of the document stressing that this Concept as any other national document has declarative character. Moreover, it would be difficult to implement the Concept, because of lack of judicial mechanisms and appropriate funding for realization of the document.93

However not to draw hasty conclusions, the following part discusses the Concept’s objectives and the process of developing it. With regards to the ethnic policy and relations among different ethnic groups living in Kyrgyzstan the inventors of the Concept put forth civic identity as the preferred path to building peace. Thus the core goal of the Concept is consolidation of the people of Kyrgyzstan – nation-building.94 The key argument of the new Concept is that “Kyrgyz ethnos is the uniting core of the poly-ethnic population of Kyrgyzstan.”95 Eventually, this motto is intended to address the sentiments of the Kyrgyz ethnic group to evoke sense of patriotism and responsibility, but it can have a negative effect on other ethnic groups.

For Byman, strong accent on one ethnic group in identity manipulation might trigger undesirable hardening of the ethnic minority’s identity.96 However the national authorities tend to stress on identity manipulation and declare the Concept to be the core of the peace processes. Despite extreme importance of the Concept, it took almost three years to develop and adopt the guideline. Perhaps “Ata-Jurt” party is the main contributor to the procrastinated adoption of the Concept. Ethnonationalistic “Ata-Jurt” developed and proposed a counter concept -“The State Ethnic Policy in the Kyrgyz Republic.” In its logic, Kyrgyzstan has to construct itself around the Kyrgyz nation, conceived as “the integrating and consolidating pivot of the Kyrgyz society.”97

92 Interview with Avazkan Ormonova, Manager in –Charge of the DIA NGO (Osh city, July, 2013)
93 Interview Akylbek Tashkulov, Center for international protection (Osh city, Juy, 2013)
94 Supra n 45, p 5
95 Supra n 45, p 6
96 Supra n. 16
97 Project of the Ata-Jurt concept, see attached Appendix C
integration would then be less about protecting minorities’ interests than about developing their sense of Kyrgyz patriotism. This theme was taken up by Wimmer, who argues that new elites “try to establish a distinction between a dominant ethnonational core, the people considered to represent the legitimate foundation…and those who are seen not as belonging to that core.”

The confrontations between presidential apparatus and “Ata-Jurt” party during discussion of the concept can be considered as an obstacle to the operative Concept adoption. Moreover, it is a marker of the weak capacity of the Department’s mandate. Finally, after harsh debates and thorough work the document was approved. Correspondingly “Ata-Jurt’s” suggestion to unite the people of Kyrgyzstan around ethnic Kyrgyz found its reflection in the new Concept. As it is highlighted above the new Concept is also stressing the role of the Kyrgyz ethnic group. According to Ormonova, some of the amendments proposed by “Ata-Jurt” go against human rights, in particular, the notion of “the privileged position of Kyrgyz among others.”

However, the amendments were approved and added to the Concept. Hopefully under “dignity of the ethnic Kyrgyz” the working group meant the responsibility of the Kyrgyz ethnic group to provide security and active position in promoting civic identity. Finally, it seems that some politicians assume Kyrgyz ethnic identity as civic identity. The following sub-chapters illustrate the explicit proximity of civic identity to Kyrgyz ethno-identity. As the main instrument of the identity manipulation toward civic identity, the Concept relies on language. Thus the next sub-chapter analyzes the controversy of language as a peace tool.

“Language of Peace:” Controversy of Language

For Brubaker, “coercive nationalizers” use language as the most efficient means to manipulate identities. The Concept illuminates the Kyrgyz language as unifying instrument. In fact the necessity of learning government language is being debated since the early 90s. Although, authorities were trying to propagate the usage of Kyrgyz language, majorities remained resistant to Kyrgyz language, and preferred Russian or other native language. Yet, the state policy of promoting Kyrgyz language resulted in 57 % of the Kyrgyz population who do not speak Russian but at the same time their

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98 Supra n. 16, p. 336
99 Supra n. 92
100 Supra n. 31, p. 15
Kyrgyz is also limited.\textsuperscript{[101]} As Tishkov notes the language factor “generates or at least shapes the ideology of ethnic conflict.”\textsuperscript{[102]} Hence language can contribute to consolidating peace as well as spoil the fragile tranquility on the ground.

However the Concept urges citizens to learn Kyrgyz and even guarantees financial reward to schools or other educational institutions for their good results in teaching Kyrgyz. Not only the Concept, but the Programme of Sustainable Development 2013-2017 also highlights Kyrgyz language as “the Language of Peace.”\textsuperscript{[103]} Indeed the role of Kyrgyz – the state language – is increasing and the multiethnic population of Osh tries to respond to this demand.

For instance, residents of \textit{On Adyr mahalla} (about 90\% are Uzbeks) are eager to open Kyrgyz classes in the local school. According to the principal of that school it is a demand of time to learn other languages thus they need to learn the state language. In that case they could have an opportunity to work and prosper in Kyrgyzstan. The parents of the children who live there seem to be positive with the need of learning Kyrgyz. Yet, neither the parents nor the management of that school addressed the local department of education with the request to open Kyrgyz classes.\textsuperscript{[104]}

The wisdom of those people is not so welcomed by some schoolchildren. For instance, 16-year-old Islam (ethnic Uzbek) who studies at the school named after Fedchenko in \textit{On Adyr mahalla} is firm that none of his classmates would attend those classes. He argued that in that case the level of their education would be lower than of pupils that study in Uzbek classes. Instead he proposed to increase the number of Russian classes. He claims it would be more profitable for them since most of his friends and he himself are going to leave the country to work in Russia.\textsuperscript{[105]} Moreover, the counselor of the head of the State Agency for Self-Governance and Interethnic relations, Omurbek Almanbetov stresses the level of education in Kyrgyz language is unfortunately very low, since there are no proficient teachers that could teach schoolchildren.\textsuperscript{[106]}

\textsuperscript{101} Supra n. 45, p. 10
\textsuperscript{102} Supra n. 31, p. 100
\textsuperscript{105} Interview with Islam, the resident of On Adyr mahalla, (Osh city, May 17, 2013)
\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Almanbet Ormonbekov, Counselor of the State Agency for Self-Governance and Interethnic Relations, (Osh city, July, 2013)
Though the intention of promoting Kyrgyz language is reasonable there is no incentive to learn it. Moreover, the obtrusive manner in which some people are promoting Kyrgyz language triggers negative feelings and fuels interethnic confrontations. As Islam highlighted “it is frustrating when you address the elder man who is Kyrgyz in Russian, but he pretends that he does not understand you and gives rude reply to talk to him in Kyrgyz.” It can be grasped that until there are evident benefits to learning Kyrgyz, some people will not be so eager to do so. The team of co-workers of the Concept might have been aware of these moods and consider that language would play a role of motivator to become a public servant. Therefore, the head of the Department for Ethnic and Religious Policy and Cooperation with Civil Society, Mira Karybaeva stated that the system similar to “Kaztest” or “TOEFL” will be adopted in Kyrgyzstan, the results of those tests will be required when hiring new civil service employee.

However, if this step is to motivate other ethnicities to learn the state language, it is arguable whether it would help. Aggressive claims made by some of the Kyrgyz authorities about dismissal of all non-Kyrgyz speakers from the government structures are also not inspiring reason to work at state institutions. This “linguistic nationalism” was briefly discussed by Hobsbawm, for whom as for the majority of scholars such an aggressive way of imposing language is the certain attribute of the nationalism of exclusion.

If to use the Kyrgyz language among population as a unifying instrument the national authorities should think thoroughly of the ways to popularize it. Although the initial idea of language as uniting people might have its logic, the realization should take more time and cautious steps. Today there is a shortfall of teachers who could teach in Kyrgyz, there is no effective methodology, and there is little incentive to learn the language. To compound that, popularization of the Kyrgyz language needs vast funding that Kyrgyzstan does not have. All that Kyrgyzstan has at the present time are unprepared society, ill thought methodology, poor vocabulary, and the strategy of imposing Kyrgyz language on population.

However, at present time many Uzbeks seem to resign themselves to the state language policy. Noah Tucker observes that:

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107 Interview with Islam, the resident of On Adyr mahalla, (May 17, 2013)
109 “Where is Justice?” Human Rights Watch report, p 26
“Many Uzbeks seemed willing to accept the post-conflict order in exchange for peace and a return to normal life—they have accepted reductions in Uzbek language schools, accepted the erasure of their language from the public space, and adapted to the closure of Uzbek media outlets in part by turning to Kyrgyz-language ones.”110

Perhaps they simply do not have another choice rather than accept the government policy. Such measures as closure of Uzbek media or initiatives of banning passing PRT (Public Republican test) in Uzbek language makes Uzbeks to resist government language policy.111 As one of the respondents argues about the need of other ethnic groups to learn Kyrgyz language stressing that when Kyrgyz migrants leave to Russia they speak Russian.112 However he has forgotten that Uzbeks and Kyrgyz live on the same territory for centuries. Common past and land bind those ethnicities.

It should be admitted that the strong emphasis on the significance of the Kyrgyz language as a contributor to building civic identity is mostly wrong chosen strategy. Thus the artificial lines are drawn between those who belong to this land and consider it as a homeland. Such attitude threatens the integrity of the nation in the face of political and social turbulence, particularly in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the imposing of the Kyrgyz language results in nationalism of resistance by the Uzbeks and leads to aggression.

For instance, in April, 2013 Dilabza Rozahunova (half Kyrgyz/half Uyghur) living in On Adyr mahalla (mostly Uzbek population) addressed several officials complaining about abuse from her neighbors. According to Dilabza her neighbors were mocking her manner of talk, pretending that they do not understand Kyrgyz and demanding them to talk Uzbek in their mahalla. Dilabza describes systematic humiliation of her mother, thus once their neighbors drew a line around their house arguing that they should not go out of the line. The boiling point was a case when Dilabza’s son was severely beaten by the local woman Dilbar (ethnic Uzbek). Thus Dilabza had to take her son to the hospital, next day police came to investigate the case. As a result the aggression of the mahalla’s residents toward Dilabza and her family increased. The woman had to write with requests of help to international organizations, Ombudsman Office, Mayor’s office and Interior Ministry.113 To respond to her address

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112 Interview with the Osh city resident (Osh city, May, 2013)
113 Letter of complaint, see in the Appendix
the reconciliation meeting was conducted. As the result of the reconciliation meeting two sides brought apologies to each other and gave “reconciliation hug.” It is barely believed that this ostentatious hug could solve the issue.

Obviously, it is difficult to argue that this aggression is response to the language policy. However, this example reveals sensitiveness of the language issues and how they can ruin fragile peace. In this regard Ulrich Schneckener argues that if cultural rights, including language of minorities are oppressed then the national politics is on extreme path of the politics of control of the dominated groups.\textsuperscript{114} The aggressive way of promoting language should be revised According to Megoran, Kyrgyz language should have become a language of interethnic communication, though Russian and Uzbek should not be suppressed.\textsuperscript{115} Otherwise, the nationalism of exclusion will further harden ethnic identity of Uzbeks. Correspondingly, this group would never be persuaded to adopt new civic identity as superior. Thus the language policy in the framework of the Concept is full of juxtapositions. It has two sides as any coin: though the intention is laudable the implementation reveals nationalism of exclusion, when Kyrgyz elite implement the ill-thought language policy. Indeed, as Varshney stresses nationalism turns into policy of exclusion when dominant group tries to impose its values on dominated.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{SDRD: Miscalculations}

State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development is explored in order to analyze the mechanism of the financial reparations. Moreover, chapter illustrates critical evidence of the ill-thought design to “mix” victims of the June events. Though the incentive of creation of mixed livelihoods is laudable it creates a precedent of gathering in one place all people that were heavily affected by the June hostility. The flats were allocated only to those whose relatives were killed or to badly wounded persons. Thereby it is difficult to imagine those people happily living together. Moreover, the Manager-in-Charge of the Public Foundation “DIA,” Avazkan Ormonova highlights the possibility of the inappropriate allocation of the houses.

“The wounded people are coming and asking the flats even today, however we cannot know when and how this person was wounded. It is feasible that he was attacking or

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{114}] Ulrich Schneckener, Stefan Wolf “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts,” Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p 25
\item[\textsuperscript{115}] Supra n.13, p 2
\item[\textsuperscript{116}] Supra n.36, p. 86 (2)
\end{itemize}
worse killing someone and he has got his scars when his victims were trying to protect themselves,” – says Ormonova.\textsuperscript{117}

Indeed, according to Ormonova the members of the Commission do not have such mandate to investigate how the person was wounded. Despite the medical document confirming the time of being wounded, the circumstances remain vague. Furthermore, the competition over new flats also contributes to the wrong depiction of the real state. As one of the respondents claims she wished to be wounded to get the new flat.\textsuperscript{118} Thereby, she considers a new apartment as a reward. This invalid perception has more dramatic outcome in case with 10-year-old boy boasting that government has allocated the flat to his father for killing of three Uzbeks.\textsuperscript{119} It should be clarified by the government to the beneficiaries that financial reparation is not a “reward,” but necessary measure to adequately address victims’ pain, though the latter is almost impossible.

There are also such cases when people do not want to leave their damaged homes, for instance lady who lives in Cheremushki mahalla does not want to leave the ruins, although her closest relatives were killed during Osh events and she has right for the flat she claims that she does not need it. Her motives are explained as resistance to give way to “the plan of government to resettle and mix neighborhoods.”\textsuperscript{120} As Melvin points out Uzbeks think the authorities want to take advantage of the post-conflict situation and “break up Uzbek community, to move them to the margins of the city [and] to take their valuable land in the center of the city.”\textsuperscript{121} These sentiments and distrust of the Uzbeks toward the national government is key cause of the unwillingness of some people to take new flats.

According to the SDRD’s intention, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have to live together to reconcile and to maintain closer relations. The idea was prompted by relative safety of the poly-ethnic neighborhoods during June 2010. Indeed, the most damaged mahallas are mono-ethnic and people living in mono-ethnic society tend to be more radical in their negative attitude toward other minorities. For instance, the residents of Alaiku village (Alai district of Osh province, where the dominant population consists of Kyrgyz) almost never met the other ethnic groups. However they “despise Uzbeks,” arguing that “they

\textsuperscript{117} Supra n. 89
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with Erkingul, the trainer of the PF “DIA”(Osh, July, 2013)
\textsuperscript{119} Interview with Avazkan Ormonova (Osh city, July, 2013)
\textsuperscript{120} Interview Nazira Karimovna (Osh city, May, 2013)
\textsuperscript{121} Supra n. 74, p 33
should leave Kyrgyzstan.” In addition, explicit evidence is completely homogeneous Naryn, where the population has the lowest rate of the satisfaction with inter-ethnic state. In contrast, 93% of the residents of poly-ethnic Batken province are satisfied with inter-ethnic relationships. As it can be grasped people who live in mono-ethnic society are not aware of the lifestyle of other ethnic groups and consequently anxious about “others.” Additionally, Fumagalli also argues that separation of different communities can contribute to peaceful co-existence.

However, the initiative of mixed neighborhoods is controversial. On the one hand the creation of the poly-ethnic platform for living and communicating is a well-known peacebuilding measure. On the other hand in case with June events, Uzbek community does not want to leave their land and only persons whose relatives were murdered or wounded could get the apartment. Now imagine psychological state of those people who have to live together. Those people are direct actors of the June hostility and it hard to believe that they could forgive the “enemy.”

Thereby, according to Ormonova, majority of Uzbeks have rent out their flats and leave the new “peace enterprising” apartments. Perhaps it is better to let people live as they want to live if they are conditioned to a certain place. As Kaufmann paraphrases Winston Churchill “separation is the worst solution, except for all the others.” Kaufmann points out that injured persons usually are not ready for transportation, since it could bring more pain and suffer. Although, the laudable intention was looming behind the initiative of the mixed apartment blocks the idea is not suitable as nation-building and peace endeavor.

Ideally, the victims as beneficiaries should have had an opportunity to express their ideas and requests how to deal with the aftermath of the hostility in that case national government could remedy its perception among population. As Bloomfield et al stressed on the beneficiaries’ participation while “designing of the reparation measures,” thus their basic needs would be reflected in the reparation programme. It is obvious that just and legal remedies are extremely important for the victims seeking adequate restitution for the harm they suffered. At the present time, the discourse of

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122 Discussion during one of the workshops in Alaiku (Chon Alai, June, 2013)
124 Supra n. 51, p. 15
125 Supra n. 21, p 36
126 Supra n. 53, p. 158
redress should encourage governments to admit the fact that their reparation policies were inappropriate and to negotiate with the victims over morally right and politically the most feasible options to address their sufferings.

As it can be seen the SDRD was intended to “promote interethnic reconcile and dialogue after the tragic June events.” By allocating new flats to injured persons SDRD projected to reestablish friendly relations and trust, and more importantly it should result in national unity. It can be grasped that even the material reparation to the victims of the June events has direct connotation with the national unity. However, this chapter reveals the obvious controversy of the noble intention to unite people by allocating new flats to the victims of hostility. In contrast, it triggers other inadvertent processes of the resistance government policies. The following sub-chapter discusses other explicit evidence of the peace and nation-building connection to nationalism - ethnosymbolism.

**Ethnic Symbolism**

Monuments can be considered as symbolic instruments of nationalism. Up to this point, Smith lively discusses ethnosymbolism as one of the nationalism’s paradigms. Smith goes on to illuminate this concept when national governments use myths, traditions and other symbolic instruments to reinterpret or reinvent persons’ identities. Kyrgyzstan as many other post-violence state embarked upon of nation-building project via utilizing the most effective instrument – symbolic tools. Indeed, as relative stability and fragile peace was consolidated on the ground city administration launched grand constructing monuments project. Though, Smith traces the efficiency of myths, monuments and other traditional symbols as generators of national attachments he also warns of parallel concerns of mismatch of those instruments for all people.

In the discourse of the Kyrgyz nation-building the constructing of monuments has controversial effect. Thus the explicit ethnosymbolism might unite Kyrgyz majority, it barely could inspire other ethnic groups to adopt the larger group’s identity. As Kaufmann argues bloody ethnic violence usually hardens suffered group’s identity. This sub-chapter explores the effect of the re-constructing of the common identity through ethnosymbols. For, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Ministry of

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127 “Good Will Initiative: There’s Enough Happiness for All,” UNDP website, (accessed July 30, 2013)
128 Supra n. 32, p 224
129 Supra n. 21, p 19
Foreign Affairs in the South of Kyrgyzstan, Daniyar Sydykov “to forget June events means to forget WWI, WWII, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and other crucial events of the history.”\textsuperscript{130} Thus city administration has developed the most large-scale initiative - building of the monuments. By doing so city administration demonstrates direct bias toward Kyrgyz ethnic group by so excluding other ethnicities.

The city administration urges to remember the violent events in order to draw conclusions and learn lessons. Therefore, the municipality decided to construct the monuments as symbols of national unity and peaceful co-existence. To do so city administration spent millions of KGS on building monuments of the prominent Kyrgyz historical heroes such as Barsbek, Alymbek Datka and folklore hero Manas. For, Philipp Roeder the “glorious past” should be identified as first and foremost measure when building nation.\textsuperscript{131} Though the monuments are the effective tool to shape national identity, they remain dubious in terms of consolidating peace. Since most of them are Kyrgyz ethnonational, they may have questionable effect on other ethnicities. However, Mayor of Osh Melis Myrzakmatov believes that he planted the seeds of patriotism. Thus it is interesting to analyze what seeds has planted Myrzakmatov.

As Smith argues the obvious ethnosymbolic instrument of identity manipulation is building monuments to historical heroes. However the perception of the monuments varies, while some of the respondents tend to believe that it has positive effect on interethnic relations.\textsuperscript{132} Others, particularly lady who lives in Cheremushki sees absolutely polarized effect. She claims that the monument of Manas (picture) on the way from the airport is perceived as a threat to Uzbeks. According to her “monument of Manas, where his jackals are looking to the side of Uzbekistan, are symbolizing victory over Uzbeks.”\textsuperscript{133} Therefore, we can see that monuments of the national heroes have controversial effect among some of the local residents. Moreover, the explicit ethnonationalistic character of the new monuments is an evidence of the nationalism of exclusion. The fact of denying accepting the monument to Manas as symbol of peaceful co-existence signals the resistance of some representatives of Uzbek ethnic group to adopt identity of the larger group.

Interestingly, Osh city municipality’s report includes “Alai Declaration” as a decree to promote tolerance and peace. Adoption of the “Alai Declaration” is also

\textsuperscript{130} Interview with MFA reepresentative, Daniyar Sydykov (Osh city, June 2013)
\textsuperscript{131} Supra n. 35
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with the local resident (ethnic Russian, Osh city, July, 2013)
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with resident of Cheremishki (ethnic Uzbek, May 25)
seems to be controversial peace act that was made by Myrzakmatov. Though, the main focus of the decree is national unity the title of the Declaration after Alai region (the mono-ethnic region where the dominated majority are Kyrgyz and it is believed that the most active actors during June events was the youth of Alai) explicitly demonstrates its focal point of uniting Kyrgyz ethnic group. It is barely believable that Uzbeks would be eager even to read the Declaration. Thus this purely Kyrgyz ethnic symbol is considered as promoter of uniting Kyrgyz people, but not people of Kyrgyzstan.

However there are also other monuments that were built to reconcile the aftermath of the violence. For instance, beautiful monument symbolizes suffering of mothers (Uzbek and Kyrgyz women) that are mourning together for their children. Not far from the monument to mothers, there is another symbol of peace and sorrow at the same time, the Bell of Peace. As for this monument, the fact that there is no actual bell, but the empty hook does not make desirable effect (Figure 4), to compound that the manuscripts that were left by vandals also demonstrate indifference of people to the symbol of peace (Figure 5). Thus, we can flag the fact that effect of this particular monument is also under question as monuments to the Kyrgyz national heroes.

The monuments to Kyrgyz prominent historical figures indeed can evoke patriotic sentiments but only in ethnic Kyrgyz. As for the ethnic Uzbeks in most of the cases it does not have any associations. While the majority feels no more than indifference, others are completely negative about these monuments. The other interesting observation can be considered as an evidence of the dubious success of these monuments amongst population. It has become a tradition to visit those monuments during weddings; newlyweds ask the spirits of those heroes to
bless their marriage. During two months of being in Osh, I have not seen a single Uzbek newlywed visiting these monuments.

**Interethnic Marriages: “Imposing Impersonality?”**

Tishkov and Byman while illuminate the importance of the mixed marriages as instruments of identity manipulation or nation-building. Citing Vladimir Pimenov, Tishkov argues that interethnic marriages can cause disappearance of the ethnic group by imposing impersonality.\(^{134}\) Here the study does not intend to debate with those respectable scholars, but to merely point out that Osh city administration initiated the most controversial local peace measure - rewarding of interethnic marriages as a way of promoting reconciliation. Many implications of this strategy represent a rich repository of both cautionary and imaginative ideas about peacebuilding.

Though the role of rewarding of interethnic marriages as reconciliation activity seems to be dubious peculiar, Aksana Ismailbekova highlights the institute of marriage as a successful strategy to overcome the consequences of Osh violence.\(^{135}\) The author argues that such kind of marriages can stop the violence, because one’s former enemy is becoming a member of one’s family.\(^{136}\) Thereby, it becomes a union not only between two individuals but between two groups. According to Ismailbekova marriage is an ideal instrument of creating social network. It is generally known, that during Soviet Union inter-ethnic marriages were indicators of the growing inter-ethnic harmony. Thus, government of Kyrgyz Republic tries to follow its Soviet predecessors and to use the inter-ethnic marriages as an efficient contributor to achieve their goal of consolidating peace.

As well as aforementioned academician Ismailbekova the Mayor of Osh city, Melis Myrzakmatov highlights rewarded interethnic marriages as peacebuilding measure. Thus to support or even motivate young people to marry each other Mayor’s office proposed one of the most prominent initiatives as financial encouraging of the interethnic marriages. To do so 100 000 KGS (about 2 000 USD) were allocated from the administration’s budget for each ethnic intermarriage. According to Myrzakmatov 58

\(^{134}\) Supra n. 31, p 9


\(^{136}\) AksanaIsmailbekova, “DinamikaOtnosheniy v etnicheskismeshannahsem’yahposlekonflikta v gorode Osh, FerganskayaDolina,” EthnographicheskoеObozrenie No.6 2012
newlyweds have got this money, but official report of the Mayor’s office highlights only 2 couples rewarded with the generous present of the city administration.

Interestingly interethnic couples themselves do not seem to be positive of the interethnic marriage as a peacebuilding tool. They doubt fact that 100 000 KGS or other amount of money can motivate people to marry each other. And if this money can inspire someone to marry each other, would it be good evidence? Obviously, NO. Indeed, interethnic marriages as instrument of peacebuilding and nation-building are quite risky initiative. Albeit, the project was broadly promoted by the Mass Media and the city municipality, this controversial peace event evokes more cautious questions than answers.

Indeed a number of Uzbeks see the conspiracy behind the curtains. Thus they believe that by this act Kyrgyz government is trying to establish homogeneous society since only couples where fiancé was ethnic Kyrgyz and bride was ethnic Uzbek were rewarded. It is commonly known that Central Asian society is a patriarch one; hence women that got married Kyrgyz are themselves becoming Kyrgyz and their children also are considered to be Kyrgyz. Therefore they think that rewarded interethnic marriages are social expansion. As Tishkov paraphrases Aidar Khalim interethnic marriages are “immoral and destructive to national culture.” For Byman rewarding men of one ethnic group for taking wives of other ethnic group is an instrument of destroying others’ identities.

However Mass Media as well as local government actively propagate ethnic intermarriages. Thus CentralAsia Online reported that in Osh and surrounded villages the number of interethnic marriages in increasing. According to the local authorities it is a positive tendency that indicates interethnic tolerance in the region. As a Head of the socio-cultural department of Osh city Mayor’s office, Gulmira Erkulova claims the growing number of interethnic marriages is a good trend that positively impacts on peacebuilding processes. According to the main specialist of the city register office, Urkuya Kurmanalieva the number of interethnic marriages is growing. Thus, in 2011 only 7 marriages were registered, in 2012 – 40, while this year 22 interethnic marriages have been already registered. Mostly intermarriages are between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz. The expert of the “Meerban” NGO, Liliya Ismanova stresses that such

137 Interview with Myrzakmatov (Bishkek, May 2013)
138 Interview with newlyweds (Osh, July 2013)
139 Supra n 31, p 9
140 Supra n. 18, p 117
kind of marriages should be rewarded not only on the local level, but on the national level.  

As it can be seen state authorities as well as civil society seems to be positive of rewarding interethnic marriages. However, this study argues that rewarding of ethnic intermarriages is immoral and could have dramatic consequences. First, if any amount of money inspires young people marry each other it is at least sad. Second, this risky initiative can harden Uzbeks’ nationalism of resistance. As it is highlighted above Uzbeks see the intention of creating ethnically homogenous society while rewarding Kyrgyz fiancés for taking Uzbek brides. Such kind of identity manipulation can radicalize subordinated ethnic groups and turn into nationalism of resistance when their identity hardens instead of becoming flexible.

Given these problems and difficulties, this study tries to illuminate the importance of re-shaping the ongoing identity manipulation attempts. Yet such a conclusion would be overly pessimistic and unwarranted. A general depiction and analysis are more than desirable to understand and explain the missteps of the national government in promoting new identity to build sustainable peace. In this sense, Hobsbawm points out that changing identity would take generations. However, even today it can be observed that government attempts to promote new common identity encounters certain perils.

Kaufmann concedes that one of the crucial threats of promotion new identity is the experienced violence itself. He argues that nation-building can actually cause new conflict. This is feasible because post-violence society tend to harden its identity. Thus, instead of promoting new identity state authorities trigger radical nationalism of resistance. As Varshney highlights such nationalism evokes when majority attempts to expand its identity on others. Indeed some “coercive nationalizers” are so eager to impose their values on other ethnic groups that subordinated groups unconsciously start to reject new identity.

As it can be concluded Kaufmann’s scenario suggesting that identity manipulation or nation-building can irritate suffered ethnic groups complies with post-June events reality in Kyrgyzstan. The analysis of few government peace initiatives showed that peace activities are directed at evoking patriotic sentiments of Kyrgyz

ethnic group. This nationalism of exclusion caused the nationalism of resistance, when other ethnic groups deny accepting other identity.

Wimmer signals that “much discussed nation-building in weak states and multiple-ethnicised states has little chance to go beyond the euphoric conjuration of national unity.”^{142} As Wimmer concludes that national government could galvanize “competing ethnonationalist demands,” instead of transformation of ethnic identities into common entity.^{143} While ethnonationalists are manipulating identities of the subordinated group, it has to defend itself from such policies. This is mirrored in case with Kyrgyzstan, when nationalist politicians in attempt to prove the ownership over the state are imposing their values on other ethnic groups. As a result Uzbeks resist this policy by denying the explicit ethnonationalist values of the larger ethnic group.

However for Megoran, “nationalism is … an ambiguous phenomenon that will continue to be the main mechanism for ordering political life in Kyrgyzstan for the foreseeable future.”^{144} Indeed its ambiguity might be manipulated by the state politicians to be inclusive or exclusive. However, in Kyrgyzstan along an ethnic inclusion intention the biased ethnic exclusion can be easily traced. Obviously enough, the fact of radicalization of the nationalism should be understood and admitted, so that national government could reshape its identity manipulation policy. This should be done to avoid further nationalism resistance by Uzbek ethnic group.

^{143} Ibid, p 15
^{144} Supra n. 13, p. 12
CONCLUSION

The study attempts to understand and to illuminate the impact of the government peace activities on political environment of the post-violence Kyrgyzstan. Brutal ethnic confrontations of 2010 showed that ethnicity is an epicenter of the conflict processes in Kyrgyzstan. Through in-depth research of the post-hostility peacebuilding activities, the thesis reveals that state government has chosen the ambitious and risky means of identity manipulation to consolidate peace. Insights from the academic literature on nation-building as a peacebuilding instrument (Byman 2002; Solomon and Mathews 2008; Simonsen 2004), nationalism (Hobsbawm 1998; Smith 1998; Wimmer 2004) and ethnic conflicts (Tishkov 1997; Schneckener and Wolf 2004) have been useful in research that focuses on Osh case. Yet, at the same moment this study contributes more general theoretical interest of nation-building as peacebuilding.

The findings illustrated in this study lead to the following remarks. First, Kyrgyzstani national government has chosen nation-building as the most suitable kind of peace projects to respond to the aftermath of the June violence. Thus in the framework of this paper a range of government peace projects have been analyzed:

- Concept for Ethnic Policy and Consolidation of Society in Kyrgyzstan;
- State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development;
- State Agency for Self-Governance and Interethnic Relations; and
- Osh city municipality’s response (promoting tolerance and construction of the monuments).

Highlighting various post-violence government peace activities the paper identifies the connection of nation-building to peacebuilding in case with post-hostility Osh. Focused on nation-building endeavor as post-June events government response, the contribution intended to analyze the after-effects and short-term impact of the state response.

Second, revealing the prominent place of nation-building in the peacebuilding processes, this study argues that nationalism as a model of nation-building becomes a serious issue to be aware of. In this regard, this study of post-violence government response highlights how some noble state peace endeavors have impacted the fragile peace on the ground. Particularly, paper analyzes such government peace activities as:
rewarded ethnic intermarriages, language controversy, promoting of civic identity by means of ethnic symbols (monuments) and some limitations of the SDRD’s activities.

Third, what emerges clearly from a study of state peace and nation-building activities are reifying in the ugliest form of nationalism – ethnonationalism or nationalism of exclusion. This study analyzes the most illustrative and controversial government peace activities: rewarding of ethnic intermarriages; promoting civic identity by means of “language of peace” - Kyrgyz language (State Programme of Sustainable Development 2013-2017); and constructing of the monuments to the prominent Kyrgyz historic figures. This contribution illuminates that these measures are built on profoundly Kyrgyz ethnic identity. Thus referring to civic identity Kyrgyz state authorities tend to impose Kyrgyz ethnic values on other ethnic groups.

Fourth, and in conclusion, the Uzbeks in Osh tend to deny the civic identity being promoted by the government authorities. The study of the post-violence peace activities through nation-building has shown the evoking of the nationalism of resistance. As Kaufmann (1996) argues imposing of the larger group’s identity results in hardening of the ethnic identity of the subordinated group. This contribution concludes that nationalism of resistance has been a predictable response to the aggressive policy of Kyrgyz nationalism.

The accelerating ethnonationalism is not necessarily rooted in ill will or hidden interests of some government authorities or politicians – albeit this may exist, too. However, the overdramatizing of the current peace processes’ effects is not the best strategy. This contribution seeks to claim that at least recognizing the devastating effects of nationalism as a new mainstream of the Kyrgyzstan’s society would assist in designing more efficient strategies. There is no need to deodorize the reality, whereas ethnic nationalism both Uzbek and Kyrgyz should be admitted to be new component of the Kyrgyzstani society.

George Orwell emphasizes “the nationalistic loves and hatreds...are a part of the make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not.”145 Thus the ultimate priority today is benefiting of such sentiments. As Megoran argues, nationalism is a new context in which the national actors as well as the international community have to exist. Though, he stresses that nationalism should be progressive in a way of its inclusion, but not exclusion. The leaders of the country should focus on tomorrow by means of today.


Conversi, Daniele. “Mapping the Field: Theories of Nationalism and the Ethnosymbolic Approach.” In: Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and


Kontsepsiya Ukrepleniya Edinstva Naroda I Mejetnicheskih Otnosheniy v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike.


## APPENDIX A

### LIST OF THE INTERVIEWS

<table>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Date and Place</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Melis Myrzakamtov</td>
<td>Mayor of Osh</td>
<td>Bishkek, May 2013</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Daniyar Sydykov</td>
<td>Plenipotentiary Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the South of Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Osh, June 2013</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Gulzhan Altymyshova</td>
<td>Specialist, Osh city Mayor’s Office</td>
<td>Osh, June 2013</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Almanbet Ormonbekov</td>
<td>Counselor of the Director, State Agency for Self-governance and Interethnic relations</td>
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<td>Myrza Jeenbekov</td>
<td>Head of the Regional Department of the State Agency</td>
<td>Osh, July 2013</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Artem Aznaurian</td>
<td>Manager of the Politico-Military Dimension, OSCE Field Office in Osh</td>
<td>Osh, July 2013</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Esenbek Urmanov</td>
<td>Conflict Studies Scholar, Practitioner, Senior Programme Assistant, OSCE OFO</td>
<td>Osh, June 2013</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Kimairis Toogod-Luehrs</td>
<td>Senior Peacebuilding Trainer and Facilitator, International Alert Doctoral Candidate, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University (GMU)</td>
<td>Bishkek, May 2013</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Gulzhamaal Sheripkanova</td>
<td>Master of Arts, Conflict and Peace Studies, CEU, former manager of the UNDP PDP</td>
<td>Interview by Skype, Scotland, August 2013</td>
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<td>Medetbek Sagynbaev and Mamadalieva Barno</td>
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<td>Erlan Aitmanbetov</td>
<td>Husband in the ethnic intermarriage being rewarded for the marriage</td>
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<td>Nazira Karimovna</td>
<td>Resident of the Cheremushki mahalla in Osh</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Resident of the On-Adyr mahalla in Osh</td>
<td>Osh, May 2013</td>
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<td>Nodirbek</td>
<td>Resident of the Nariman suburban village</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Feruza</td>
<td>Resident of the Cheremushki mahalla in Osh</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Natalya</td>
<td>Resident of Osh, Teacher at school</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Avazkan Ormonova</td>
<td>Manager-in-Chrage of the DIA NGO in Osh</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Erkingul</td>
<td>Trainer at the DIA NGO</td>
<td>Osh, July 2013</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Akylbek Tashkulov</td>
<td>Manager-in-Charge of Center for International Protection</td>
<td>Osh, July 2013</td>
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APPENDIX B
ILLUSTRATIONS

Monument to Alymbek Datka.

Monument to Alymbek Datka

Monument to Barsbek
Monument to Manas

Public Transport in Osh calling for consolidating of interethnic unit

Text on the “Bell of Peace”